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ARTICLE

PRISON VOUCHERS

ALEXANDER VOLOKH

†

School vouchers have been proposed as a way to bypass the political pathologies of school reform and improve school quality by transforming students and
parents into consumers. What if we did the same for prisons—what if convicted
criminals could choose their prison rather than being assigned bureaucratically?
Under a voucher system, prisons would compete for prisoners, meaning
that the prisons will adopt policies prisoners value. Prisons would become more
constitutionally flexible—faith-based prisons, now of dubious legality, would be
fully constitutional, and prisons would also have increased freedom to offer
valued benefits in exchange for the waiver of constitutional rights. As far as
prison quality goes, the advantages of vouchers would plausibly include greater
security, higher-quality health care, and better educational opportunities—
features that prison reformers favor for their rehabilitative value.
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The counterarguments are threefold. “Social meaning” and other philosophical arguments hold that choice in prison conditions is either impossible or
morally undesirable. On the more economic plane, “market failure” arguments
hold that because of informational or other problems prisoner choice would not
succeed in improving overall prison quality. “Market success” arguments, on
the other hand, hold that prison choice would improve prison quality too much,
satisfying inmate preferences that are socially undesirable or diluting the deterrent value of prison. These counterarguments have substantial force but do not
foreclose the possibility that prison choice results in socially desirable improvements that could outweigh these disadvantages.
I conclude with thoughts about the politics of prison vouchers, both before
and after their adoption.
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INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I invite the reader to indulge in a thought experiment. What would the world look like if, instead of assigning a prisoner to a particular prison bureaucratically, we gave the prisoner a
voucher, good for one incarceration, to be redeemed at a participating prison?
1
School vouchers have been debated to death ever since Milton
2
Friedman proposed them in 1955 and progressives championed
3
them in the 1960s. Vouchers have also been discussed and used for

1

And actually adopted in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and elsewhere. Caroline M. Hoxby, School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States, 10 SWED. ECON.
POL’Y REV. 11, 11, 15 (2003). School voucher effectiveness remains a topic of debate.
Compare id. at 11 (arguing that voucher programs have improved student performance
and created positive incentives for struggling public schools), with Helen F. Ladd, Comment on Caroline M. Hoxby: School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United
States, 10 SWED. ECON. POL’Y REV. 67, 71-72, 74-75 (2003) (disputing Hoxby’s claims).
2
Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education (“Governments could require a minimum level of education which they could finance by giving parents vouchers redeemable for a specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on ‘approved’
educational services.”), in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123, 127 (Robert A.
Solo ed., 1955). Friedman was not the first theorist to propose school choice. See
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1869) (arguing that the government “might leave to
parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with
helping to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of children”), reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS OF JOHN STUART MILL 3, 126 (1926); THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS
OF MAN (1791) (proposing a distribution of surplus funds to poor families for them to
spend on the education of their children), reprinted in THE GREAT WORKS OF THOMAS
PAINE 5, 185 n.* (D.M. Bennett ed., New York, Liberal & Scientific Publ’g House
1877); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 822 (Edwin Cannan ed., 2000) (1776)
(arguing that competition would improve educational quality if students were given
scholarships and “left free to chuse what college they liked best”).
3
See, e.g., Christopher Jencks, Private Schools for Black Children, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (stating the proposal in terms of a tax subsidy instead of
vouchers, but with generally similar substance); Theodore Sizer & Phillip Whitten, A
Proposal for a Poor Children’s Bill of Rights, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Aug. 1968, at 59, 62 (suggesting that a voucher program would “provide an incentive to middle-class schools to
take in poor children”); see also James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice:
How Progressives Got There First, 93 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1309-12 (2005) (discussing voucher
plans proposed in the late 1960s by progressives including Jencks, Sizer, and Whitten).

VOLOKH REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/15/2012 7:15 PM

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

782

[Vol.160: 779
4

5

other government services, including housing, health care, child
care, job training, environmental protection, welfare, nutrition, and
6
transportation.
Vouchers are no stranger to the criminal justice system: they are
used for halfway houses, mandatory anti-alcohol and drug treatment
7
8
programs, and criminal defense lawyers for the indigent. A voucher
system was implemented in a few states in the 1970s to allow inmates
to buy training and education as part of “mutual agreement programs”—also known as “contract parole” programs—that helped in4

See Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57
UCLA L. REV. 983, 990-92 (2010) (examining housing vouchers and finding some success that never developed into wider application).
5
See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, Health Care Vouchers—A Proposal for
Universal Coverage, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1255, 1255-56 (2005) (advocating for health
care vouchers as a mechanism for creating universal coverage while preserving consumer choice).
6
See, e.g., Paul Posner et al., A Survey of Voucher Use: Variations and Common Elements
(proposing voucher usage for the provision of many government services), in VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 503, 504-13 (C. Eugene Steuerle et al.
eds., 2000). In Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle’s definition, “voucher programs do not depend upon the issuance of any certificate or other physical manifestation of the financing scheme; rather, voucher programs earn that characterization by the elements of
beneficiary designation of the provider coupled with government payment based on
individualized services or goods provided to the beneficiary.” Ira C. Lupu & Robert
Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service
Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 539, 539 n.4 (2002).
7
See JUDITH GREENE & TIMOTHY ROCHE, JUSTICE POLICY INST., CUTTING CORRECTLY IN MARYLAND 30 (2003) (recommending the use of vouchers to pay Maryland
drug treatment providers); see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum,
324 F.3d 880, 884 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding the constitutionality of a state voucher
program that allowed alcohol and drug offenders to choose between religious and
secular rehabilitation programs).
Judge Posner commented on the usage of the term “voucher”:
We have put “vouchers” in scare quotes because the state has dispensed with
the intermediate step by which the recipient of the publicly funded private
service hands his voucher to the service provider. But . . . there is no difference between giving the voucher recipient a piece of paper that directs the
public agency to pay the service provider and the agency’s asking the recipient
to indicate his preference and paying the provider whose service he prefers.
Id. at 882.
8
Defense counsel voucher systems have been implemented in Ontario and in
England and Wales. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking
Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and
Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 110-11 (1993)
(arguing that a similar system of counsel vouchers is possible in the United States); see
also Posner et al., supra note 6, at 506-07 (noting examples of voucher programs in the
realm of criminal justice, including a “Goods for Guns” program and disbursements of
clothing vouchers for those on probation).
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9

mates work toward parole. This last idea was taken up in 1978 in the
10
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, which suggested that prisoners get vouchers to purchase “specified treatment programs and ser11
vices directly from either public or private agencies.”
But, as far as I can tell, no one has ever discussed vouchers as a se12
rious possibility for prisons.
9

See FAY HONEY KNOPP ET AL., INSTEAD OF PRISONS: A HANDBOOK FOR ABOLITION97-98 (1976) (reviewing the voucher components of mutual agreement programs
in Maryland); DAVID T. STANLEY, PRISONERS AMONG US: THE PROBLEM OF PAROLE 6668 (1976) (reviewing mutual agreement programs in Wisconsin, California, and Arizona); James O. Finckenauer & Carol Rauh, Contract Parole: Some Legal and Rehabilitative
Issues of Mutual Agreement Programming for Parole Release, 5 CAP. U. L. REV. 175, 194
(1976) (describing mutual agreement program vouchers in California); Leon Leiberg
& William Parker, Mutual Agreement Programs with Vouchers: An Alternative for Institutionalized Female Offenders, AM. J. CORRECTIONS, Jan.–Feb. 1975, at 10, 13 (discussing an early California experiment with inmate training vouchers); Ronald J. Scott, Contract Programming in Probation: Philosophical and Experimental Bases for Building a Model, 4 JUST.
SYS. J. 49, 54 (1978) (presenting an overview of voucher programs in California and
Maryland); id. at 64-65 (including funding for community services vouchers in a model
of a contractual probation system); id. at 65 (describing Michigan’s voucher system
that is part of its probation program, which allows for the “provision of financial assistance to secure services available in the community”); Steve Gettinger, Parole Contracts:
A New Way Out, CORRECTIONS MAG., Sept.–Oct. 1975, at 3, 4 (discussing vouchers in
Maryland and plans for vouchers in Massachusetts).
10
MODEL SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS ACT §§ 4-701 to -706, in 10 UNIFORM LAWS
ANNOTATED 325, 535-40 (2001).
11
Id. § 4-701(a). This feature of the Model Act, to my knowledge, hasn’t been
adopted anywhere. See also id. § 4-703(b) (proposing vouchers be used “to purchase
programs or services relating to [a person’s] care, rehabilitation, treatment, or adjustment to life in the free community, including: (1) academic programs; (2) vocational
training programs; (3) medical or psychiatric services; (4) counseling services, including personal, marital, employment, or financial counseling; and (5) any other program
or service approved by the director”); id. § 4-704(a) (“An application may not be denied solely because the applicant provides programs or services already available from
the department or elsewhere.”).
12
A search for “prison vouchers” in Westlaw’s JLR and ALLCASES databases yields
no results, other than my own recent work. See Alexander Volokh, The Constitutional
Possibilities of Prison Vouchers, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 983 (2011) [hereinafter Volokh, Constitutional Possibilities]; Alexander Volokh, Book Review, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 323, 326-27
(2010) (reviewing WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PRISON RELIGION: FAITH-BASED REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2009)). Cf. Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1998, at 133, 139 (“[P]risoner choice is not a realistic possibility . . . .”). There’s been no shortage of offhand comments and jokes about prison
vouchers, often in sarcastic response to school choice proposals. E.g., Bruce Shapiro,
Portfolio Prisons, NATION, Oct. 20, 1997, at 4, 5 (characterizing a joke about prison
vouchers as “not quite as facetious as it sounds”); gocards44, Prison Vouchers, KEVIN
BURKE’S WEBLOG (Mar. 29, 2007, 6:22 PM), http://gocards44.wordpress.com/
2007/03/29/prison-vouchers (suggesting a system of prison vouchers, while acknowledging that it “would never get past Congress”); Lightning Bug’s Butt, Even More Bulletins, LIGHTNING BUG’S BUTT (Feb. 19, 2007, 11:40 PM), http://bugsbutt.blogspot.com/
ISTS
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This is a shame, because some of the same factors that led early
education reformers to suggest school vouchers apply with equal, if
not greater, force in the context of prisons. Both prisons and schools
face a similar confluence of three factors:
1. Both face widespread and serious problems.
2. The problems in both areas have proven hard to solve through
the usual political, administrative, and judicial means.
3. Allocation of students to schools, like the allocation of inmates
to prisons, is predominantly done bureaucratically, with limited
possibilities for choice.
The prima facie case for considering a market solution, in which
the subject population would become consumers and thus drive reform by voting with its feet—essentially, getting rid of (3) to bypass (2)
and thereby solve (1)—thus seems strong.
Let me focus on (1) for a bit. Modern American prisons—with
their high violence rates, bad medical care, overuse of highly punitive
measures like administrative segregation, and the like—are widely be13
lieved to be of low quality. Note the similarity to the views of early
school voucher proponents on the left, who wrote that the “public
schools have not been able to teach most black children to read and
14
write or to add and subtract competently” and that the public school
15
system “destroys rather than develops positive human potential.”
We should care about prison quality even if we don’t care about
prisoners themselves because bad prison conditions often indirectly
2007/02/even-more-bullet-ins.html (sarcastically envisioning an advertisement for a
voucher prison “where the guard beatings are minimal”); yourworstnightmare, Comment to Do You Think Kansas Should Have Private Prisons?, LJWORLD.COM (Mar. 26,
2006, 9:56 AM), http://www2.ljworld.com/onthestreet/2006/mar/26/prisons/
#cll8025 (proposing prison vouchers in response to the question of whether Kansas
should privatize its prisons). “Prison vouchers” as discussed here shouldn’t be confused with the same expression that is occasionally used to refer to money that prisoners can use in some penal systems to buy products in prison. See, e.g., ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON 43 (Daphne Hardy trans., Bantam Books 1986) (1941)
(describing a system of vouchers in a fictional prison where the vouchers are required
to purchase goods); ARTHUR KOESTLER, DIALOGUE WITH DEATH 147 (Trevor & Phyllis
Blewitt trans., Macmillan Co. 1942) (“Angelito came to change the hundred peseta
note into prison vouchers.”).
13
See infra Section I.A.
14
Jencks, supra note 3, at 30.
15
Sizer & Whitten, supra note 3, at 62. But see KEVIN B. SMITH & KENNETH J.
MEIER, THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE: POLITICS, MARKETS, AND FOOLS 16-19
(1995) (arguing that voucher proponents are overstating some of the problems with
public education).
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hurt the rest of society. Brutal conditions, as well as excessive use of
18
high-security segregation, make prisoners less useful members of so19
ciety and more likely to reoffend. The low level of educational, vocational, and rehabilitative programs also contributes to recidivism. Furthermore, communicable diseases can spill over into the outside world
20
when infected inmates are released. The risk of multi-drug-resistant
tuberculosis in New York in the 1980s and early 1990s may have been
21
linked to poor medical treatment in prisons and jails.
There are thus clear opportunities for gains from prison vouchers—not just to prisoners, but also to society at large—as competing
prisons seek to attract prisoners by offering better security, medical
22
care, and vocational programs.
But, now focusing on (2), why can’t we “just” fix prisons by other
means, such as reform legislation, administrative oversight, or litigation?
16

See James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993,
1006-09 (2010) (reviewing PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009)) (asserting that prison violence, overcrowding, and the lack of educational
and treatment programs present a threat to public safety when offenders are released).
17
See M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 17-21 (2007) (arguing
empirically that harsh prison conditions make prisoners more likely to reoffend);
Francesco Drago et al., Prison Conditions and Recidivism, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 103,
120-25 (2011) (finding similar results in a study of Italian prisoners); Daniel S. Nagin
et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 115 (2009) (concluding, after reviewing the available literature, that “incarceration appears to have a null or
mildly criminogenic effect on future criminal behavior”); Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto
Schargrodsky, Criminal Recidivism After Prison and Electronic Monitoring 28 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15602, 2009, rev. 2010) (finding that recidivism
rates are lower for offenders who are electronically monitored than for offenders who
are sent to prison).
18
THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 52-53 (2006).
19
See Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 237, 245 (2009) (“[T]he people who have been marked out for incarceration may
become through the experience of incarceration the very ‘anti-social’ misfits whose exclusion
from society was thought so necessary.”); Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 352-61 (2009) (suggesting that restrictive regulation of visitation and outside correspondence has adverse effects on prisoners’ relationships with
their families and communities).
20
See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 13
(“Every year, more than 1.5 million people are released from jail and prison carrying a
life-threatening contagious disease.”).
21
Id. at 47 (citing research showing a correlation between time spent in prison
and diagnosis with tuberculosis); see also GEORGE KNOX, AN INTRODUCTION TO GANGS
465 (5th ed. rev. 2000) (noting that over half of correctional facilities surveyed in 1999
reported having had inmates diagnosed with tuberculosis during the last year).
22
See infra Section I.A.
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Legislative prison reform is a tough sell—criminals are widely vili23
fied. In contrast, in the school reform context, all politicians at least
24
25
claim to like kids. Nor are elected officials eager to fund prisons.
Some reformers recognize that prison administrators or legislators
26
have shown little interest in improving prisoners’ lives, especially if
27
such improvements carry a cost. Nonetheless, reformers continue to
“urge” and “encourage” these same officials to increase prison ex28
penditures or implement reforms. Of course there’s nothing wrong
23

See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 9, 12 (1999) (noting that politicians frequently favor harsher sentencing
laws in order to curry favor with voters).
24
See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (reflecting nationwide concern with the education of children in public schools).
25
See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment
Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 82-83 (2008) (observing opposition to prison funding from
state legislatures).
26
See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 30
(finding that the “direct supervision” technique faces resistance that is mostly “attitudinal” and prison officials usually react to the idea with “astonishment”); id. at 31 (arguing that direct supervision will not succeed unless officers “have the competence to
understand and respect persons from different racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds”); id. at 35 (noting that a shift in priorities toward placing prisons closer to
inmates’ communities “would require tremendous political will”).
27
See id. at 36 (acknowledging that welcoming visitors and helping with transportation would be costly); id. (stating that prisons are under pressure from state legislatures to use telephone contracts to generate income); id. at 39 (“[L]egislatures chronically underfund correctional health care.”); id. at 41 (“Partnerships between
correctional agencies and community health-care providers . . . require openness and
flexibility on the part of participating correctional agencies, a broad-minded sense of
mission, and a deep commitment to that mission on the part of participating public
health agencies.”); id. at 46 (stating that adequate mental health standards “cannot be
met without better funding”); id. at 48 (“[U]nder significant pressure from state lawmakers to control spiraling medical costs, correctional facilities began charging prisoners co-payments for health care.”); id. (acknowledging “the tremendous pressure on
corrections administrators to contain costs and hold prisoners accountable”); id. at 79
(“[S]ome corrections administrators have been resistant to external monitoring, and
by and large the public and its representatives have not insisted on it.”); id. (“[T]he
few [external monitoring] systems that do exist are generally underresourced and lacking in real power.”); see also Lynn S. Branham, “The Mess We’re In”: Five Steps Towards the
Transformation of Prison Cultures, 44 IND. L. REV. 703, 732 (2011) (“There is always reticence or resistance on the part of many to initiatives to depart from the status quo.”).
28
See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 14
(“Lawmakers must provide adequate funding . . . .”); id. at 39 (“[T]he Commission
urges lawmakers to adequately fund correctional health care.”); id. at 41 (“[T]he
Commission urges correctional agencies and community health-care providers to consider the benefits of forging solid partnerships”); id. at 49 (“The Commission believes
the risks are too great to justify any short-term cost-savings and urges state lawmakers to
eliminate co-payments and provide corrections departments with the resources they
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with urging, and some reforms have been implemented even in the
29
face of political pressure to the contrary. But it’s unsurprising that
30
mere urges haven’t gone very far.
Administrative solutions are likewise difficult because prison offi31
cials resist “scrutiny by ‘outsiders.’”
Independent inspection and
monitoring, as well as internal oversight mechanisms, such as effective
32
grievance systems, are underused.
33
Judicial solutions are also unpromising. Courts often defer to the
34
judgment of prison administrators, and prisons are exempt from ad35
Prisoner litigation,
ministrative procedure acts in many states.
whether as individual claims or as more ambitious prison reform cas-

need to provide quality medical care . . . .”); id. at 74 (“Corrections leaders . . . must
have the courage to confront executive and legislative leaders when proposed policies
and budgets threaten the health and safety of our prisons and jails, and of our communities.”); id. (“[E]xecutive branch officials must stand up to organized labor . . . .”);
id. at 81 (“The Commission strongly urges states to create a monitoring body independent of the department of corrections . . . .”); id. at 88 (“The Commission urges
many more facilities to seek accreditation and, at the same time, urges the ACA [American Correctional Association] to strengthen the process so that accreditation is even
more meaningful.”); id. at 92 (“The Commission encourages the ACA to involve the
broadest range of interested parties in the process of developing ever stronger standards for correctional practice.”); see also Branham, supra note 27, at 706 (“There are
innumerable steps—some big, some small—that need to be taken . . . .”); id. at 714
(“[G]overnments can and should make transparency and accountability hallmarks of
their prisons . . . .”).
29
See, e.g., THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at
88 (explaining that efforts to promote internal accountability “are all the more impressive given that they have been largely self-generated rather than imposed through political pressure”); Branham, supra note 27, at 705 (“There are some correctional leaders,
though not nearly enough, who have publicly espoused the need for, and the feasibility
of, what has been aptly termed ‘culture busting’ in prisons.” (citations omitted)).
30
In suggesting merit pay for prison wardens, Rick Hills says that prisons might be
“the one sort of Big Government that neither party wants to reinvent,” complicating prospects for reform. Rick Hills, Merit Pay for Prison Wardens?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 3, 2008,
11:14 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/03/tying-the-salar.html.
31
THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 16.
32
See id. at 16-17 (describing existing oversight systems as “inadequate, sometimes
wholly meaningless”).
33
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential but Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in
Prison Reform, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307, 313-15 (2008) (finding that the ability of
courts to propose solutions is limited by an inability to appropriate funds, “the inherent difficulty in courts formulating standards and enforcing them,” and restrictions
imposed on judicial remedies by the Prison Litigation Reform Act).
34
See Shay, supra note 19, at 343 (“[T]he Supreme Court has accorded corrections
officials significant leeway, even when constitutional rights are implicated.”).
35
See id. at 346-47 (surveying state regimes and finding that twenty-eight have such
exemptions).
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es, is restricted by statute—for instance, by the Prison Litigation Re36
form Act (PLRA) —and by case law holding prisoners’ rights to be
37
quite limited.
Some have suggested contracting out prison management to the
private sector (but holding the method of allocating prisoners con38
stant) as a means of improving prison quality. This is a controversial
proposition—others categorically deny that contracting out improves
39
prison quality, and even some who are more sympathetic to private
contracting grant that the evidence on the quality of private prisons
40
relative to public ones is mixed.

36

The PLRA requires inmates to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing
suit in court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006). Even more controversially, the PLRA bars
recovery for mental and emotional injuries in the absence of a physical injury. Id. §
1997e(e). One district court has held the limitation on recovery for mental and emotional injuries unconstitutional as applied. Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811,
816 (E.D. Mich. 2006); see also Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of
Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 141-42 (2008) (observing that the number of lawsuits filed
per thousand inmates has declined by sixty percent since passage of the PLRA); Shima
Baradaran-Robison, Comment, Kaleidoscopic Consent Decrees: School Desegregation and
Prison Reform Consent Decrees After the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Freeman-Dowell,
2003 BYU L. REV. 1333, 1335 (“Congress clearly intended to reduce judicial involvement in the improvement of prison conditions.”).
37
See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that prisoner regulations can limit prisoners’ rights for “legitimate penological interests”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (requiring “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners” to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation).
38
See, e.g., GEOFFREY F. SEGAL & ADRIAN T. MOORE, REASON PUB. POL’Y INST.,
POL’Y STUDY NO. 290, WEIGHING THE WATCHMEN: EVALUATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OUTSOURCING CORRECTIONAL SERVICES PT. 2, at 15 (2002) (concluding that
privatization can increase quality, introduce innovation, and reduce costs); Samuel Jan
Brakel & Kimberly Ingersoll Gaylord, Prison Privatization and Public Policy, (arguing that
prison privatization will lead to greater efficiency), in CHANGING THE GUARD: PRIVATE
PRISONS AND THE CONTROL OF CRIME 125, 139 (Alexander Tabarrok ed., 2003).
39
See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 505
(2005) (arguing that private prisons will cut costs in pursuit of greater profits, causing
prison conditions to fall below the level required by the “humanity principle”).
40
See Developments in the Law–The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1875-77
(2002) [hereinafter Developments] (Part III is the author’s student note) (citing evidence that private prisons are superior to public ones on some quality indicators but
not others); cf. DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., ABT ASSOCS., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 56 (1998) (evaluating existing
studies on the quality of private prisons and finding that claims of superiority over public prisons are “not well documented”); Richard Culp, Prison Privatization Turns 25 (arguing that while private prisons may initially bring cost savings, this “cost advantage
decreases” over time), in U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY: A CONTEMPORARY READER
183, 199 (Karim Ismaili ed., 2011).
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Here, too, the parallels with schools are clear. Whether the blame
41
lies with teachers’ unions or with politicians unwilling to spend mon42
ey on schools, schools have been hard to reform politically. Litiga43
tion hasn’t worked well, and any constitutional rights to a good edu44
cation are generally weak. Privatization of entire school systems withwithin the context of mandatory government provision has been tried
45
sporadically, but the results haven’t been terribly impressive so far.

41

See Joe Klein, Failing Our Schools, TIME, Feb. 8, 2010, at 20, 20 (chronicling a
teachers’ union’s successful efforts to block New York from receiving $700 million in
federal funds for school reform).
42
See Linda Darling-Hammond, Restoring Our Schools, NATION, June 14, 2010, at 14,
18 (criticizing Reagan-era policies cutting education funding); Lisa Kaiser, An Interview
with Educator and Activist Jonathan Kozol, EXPRESSMILWAUKEE.COM (Mar. 4, 2009),
http://www.expressmilwaukee.com/article-5728-an-interview-with-educator-and-activistjonathan-kozol.html (characterizing education activist Jonathan Kozol as arguing that
“promises by states to equalize funding for urban districts never materialize”).
43
See, e.g., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 556 (Alaska 1981) (rejecting theory of negligent classification, placement, or teaching); Peter
W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (rejecting a claim against a school district for negligently failing to provide basic academic
instruction); Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585-86 (Md. 1982) (rejecting an
educational malpractice claim because ruling otherwise would require the courts to
monitor school policies and operations); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist.,
391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353 (N.Y. 1979) (refusing to recognize an educational malpractice
claim on public policy grounds because the legislature had established the school system and provided for the hearing of complaints). See generally Melanie Natasha Henry,
No Child Left Behind? Educational Malpractice Litigation for the 21st Century, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 1117 (2004) (surveying educational malpractice jurisprudence and the emergence of statutory claims under the No Child Left Behind Act); Kevin P. McJessy,
Comment, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigating Educational Liability Claims,
89 NW. U. L. REV. 1768, 1798-1803 (1995) (discussing various contract law theories of
school liability).
44
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973)
(rejecting an equal protection attack on inequalities in a Texas school system that were
attributable to a funding scheme dependent on local property tax revenues). State
constitutional challenges to funding systems have sometimes been successful. See, e.g.,
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1265 (Cal. 1971) (“[W]e are satisfied that plaintiff
children have alleged facts showing that the public school financing system denies
them equal protection . . . .”). But state constitutional challenges to educational quality have generally failed on the theory that the relevant constitutional provisions are
nonbinding, unenforceable, or only guarantees a very low minimum quality. See, e.g.,
Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54 (holding that a state constitutional provision obligated
the legislature only to maintain and support the school system). One notable exception is McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education, 615 N.E.2d 516, 554-55
(Mass. 1993), which found a constitutional right to an education and outlining seven
broad goals, but left their implementation to the legislature.
45
See, e.g., Shelby Wolff Reitz, Note, Mastering Two Services: Advancing Public Values
Through School Privatization, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 110-15 (2008) (reviewing the
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The market-based approach that prison vouchers represent has an
obvious appeal in this context. The logic is similar to that of school
choice: vouchers empower the prisoners themselves to reward and
punish prisons, creating powerful incentives for prisons to improve in
46
accordance with the prisoners’ own standards. No longer would advocates have to urge prison administrators or legislatures to reform conditions in the interest of prisoners or try to convince these authorities that
prisoner welfare is aligned with the social interest—a strategy that has
47
Instead, prison administrators would be
not worked well so far.
moved, as if by an invisible hand, to make their prisons better places.
In Part I, I explain how a prison choice program might work and
how the vouchers would be funded. I also explain how prison choice is
different from, and conceptually independent of, prison privatization.
In Part II, I discuss how vouchers would make prisons more
constitutionally flexible. First, prisons would be freer to experiment
48
with religiously inspired rehabilitation: faith-based prisons, whose
constitutionality under the current regime is dubious, would become
fully constitutional. Under vouchers, the prison system would come
within Zelman v. Simmons-Harris because prisons would be participat49
ing on a neutral basis, independent of religion. As is already the
case with halfway houses, residential programs for delinquent children, and alcoholism and drug addiction programs, participating
50
providers could be public or private, religious or secular. The participant’s ability to choose from a variety of providers, not all of which
management of Philadelphia public schools by for-profit school operator Edison
Schools, and finding modest but shaky improvement).
46
See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285, 1347 (2003) (“Vulnerability can be exacerbated when the consumers of the
service are not the same as the payers—when taxpayers, for instance, finance prisons
occupied by convicts, welfare received by eligible low-income applicants, and schools
occupied by other people’s children.”).
47
See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
48
For a discussion of different sorts of faith-based programs, see Marc O.
DeGirolami, The New Religious Prisons and Their Retributivist Commitments, 59 ARK. L. REV.
1, 13-19 (2006). For a discussion of whether faith-based programs reduce recidivism,
see Alexander Volokh, Do Faith-Based Prisons Work?, 63 ALA. L. REV. 43 (2011) (arguing
that they don’t).
49
See 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002) (holding that a school choice program that includes a large proportion of religious schools does not violate the Establishment
Clause if all schools can participate based on neutral criteria, and parents can freely
select or reject the religious school).
50
See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 884
(7th Cir. 2003) (upholding the dismissal of a suit to enjoin correctional authorities
from funding a private faith-based halfway house.)
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are religious, puts these programs in the same category as the school
vouchers upheld in Zelman.
The effect of vouchers would be more fundamental than merely
to validate existing faith-based programs. Consider private schools
under a school voucher regime. Clearly, under Zelman, they are not
limited to merely providing the sorts of ecumenical prayers that are
struck down in the public school context. Rather, they can advertise
themselves as Catholic, display cruficixes, teach theology, and do
everything else that private schools can do. Prisons would be similar.
Modern-day faith-based prisons, in an effort to comply with the Establishment Clause, aggressively seek nondenominationalism and ecu51
menism. But—just as one can disfavor “To Whom It May Concern”
prayer in schools—a religious organization may be unsatisfied with
52
prison rehabilitation based on “Religion Lite.” With vouchers, such
an organization could become far more ambitious. One could have
“religious prisons” in the proper sense, each advertising its own sectarian rehabilitative agenda. Vouchers could thus be the best, or perhaps even the only, way to allow for faith-based prisons.
Second, prisons would be freer to offer inmates packages of features that currently would be considered unconstitutional. Prisoners
have dramatically reduced rights, but they still retain some. In general, people—prisoners or not—may benefit from being able to waive
their rights in exchange for other benefits. For instance, inmates may
agree to waive some part of their due process rights in exchange for
better job training. A prison’s ability to offer such a package is limited
53
by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. I argue that, in a prison
system that is more competitive from the inmate’s point of view, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine would (and should) be somewhat more permissive because the inmates’ ability to choose would

51

See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 12, at 157-61 (documenting the efforts of InnerChange Freedom Initiative to portray its values system as so general that it would be
consistent with any religion).
52
See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the Inevitability of Religious Inequality,
1996 BYU L. REV. 569, 572 (“In my house, we do not offer prayers ‘to whom it may concern.’”); Paul Finkelman, School Vouchers, Thomas Jefferson, Roger Williams, and Protecting
the Faithful: Warnings from the Eighteenth Century and the Seventeenth Century on the Danger of
Establishments to Religious Communities, 2008 BYU L. REV. 525, 551-52 (noting that the
school prayer at issue in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), “would hardly be recognized as ‘prayer’ in any meaningful way by people of faith who take religion seriously”
and “was exactly what we would expect from a state agency trying to create a prayer that
would offend no one, side with no one, and not run counter to anyone’s faith”).
53
See infra Section II.B.
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mitigate the possibility that prisons would be illegitimately taking advantage of inmates.
With all this going for prison vouchers, what could go wrong?
In Part III, after having presented the positive case in favor of
prison vouchers, I address the problems. One possible critique is that
this idea is a nonstarter because prisoners either cannot or should not
exercise voluntary choices regarding their places of imprisonment.
Another possible critique, sounding more in economics than in
philosophy, is “market failure”—that inmate’s individual decisions
won’t succeed in improving overall prison quality. This lack of improvement could be because inmates can’t make themselves better off
through their decisions because, for instance, they are poorly informed about prison quality. The lack of improvement could also be
because some inmates’ decisions will make other inmates worse off because, for instance, the better informed inmates will get the best prisons and leave the bad prisons to the uninformed.
A third, more serious critique is what I call “market success”—that
inmates will succeed in improving prison quality by their own standards,
54
and that this is precisely the problem. Prisoners’ preferences aren’t
always good; we are, after all, talking about (presumptive) criminals.
For example, satisfying prisoner preferences may harm society by allowing gang members to serve their sentences together and thus better run their outside criminal enterprises. Alternatively, prisoner
choice may merely make prison a less undesirable place and thereby
55
undermine the deterrent value of prison.
I take these counterarguments seriously, and so I make no strong
claims about the bottom-line merits of prison vouchers. If the potential downsides—that prisoners, through their voucher spending, drive
prisons to adopt undesirable features in ways that can’t be adequately
controlled by the political process—are outweighed by the benefits—
such as improvements in prisoner security, health care, and education—then vouchers could dramatically improve penal policy. But this
Article is meant to spur further research and debate on the question,
not to come down on one side or another.
In Part IV, I deal with the politics of prison vouchers. In the first
place, if vouchers are so great, and if they improve prison conditions

54

Properly speaking, this is also a species of market failure, since prisoners’ decisions impose negative externalities on the world at large; the term “market success” is
meant to be merely evocative.
55
But see infra note 328 and accompanying text.
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as the political system hasn’t been able to, why would they ever be
adopted? Conversely, if prison vouchers are adopted, and if they’re
good for prisoners, wouldn’t their adoption be evidence of a change
in attitudes toward prisoners that would make more conventional reforms possible? In this Part, I speculate on a possible political coalition that could get prison vouchers adopted even without a change in
attitudes toward prisoners. I further speculate on how the political
system would treat prison vouchers after their adoption, both in terms
of funding and in terms of regulation.
I. THE MECHANICS
A. Choice
Inmates today have little or no choice regarding where they serve
their prison sentence. When assigning prisoners to federal prisons, the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is required to consider “the resources of the fa56
57
cility contemplated,” “the nature and circumstances of the offense,”
58
“the history and characteristics of the prisoner,” “any statement” by the
sentencing court “concerning the purposes for which the sentence . . .
59
was determined to be warranted,” and Sentencing Commission policy
60
statements. The BOP is also required to consider the sentencing court’s
61
recommendations regarding what type of facility is appropriate, but isn’t
62
required to consider recommendations of particular facilities. Moreover,
if the sentencing court “order[s], recommend[s], or request[s]” that the
convicted defendant be sentenced to a community correction facility, this
63
has “no binding effect” on the BOP.
56

18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(1) (2006). Federal law authorizes the BOP to place inmates in “any available penal or correctional facility,” whether public or private, anywhere in the federal government’s jurisdiction. Id. § 3621(b).
57
Id. § 3621(b)(2).
58
Id. § 3621(b)(3).
59
Id. § 3621(b)(4)(A).
60
Id. § 3621(b)(5).
61
Id. § 3621(b)(4)(B).
62
This can be inferred from the absence of a requirement in the relevant section
of the statute, which directs the BOP to consider the sentencing court’s recommendation only as to “type . . . of facility.” Id.
63
Id. § 3621(b). While the BOP’s regulations seem to accommodate sentencing
court recommendations, generally there’s no guarantee that the court will convey the
prisoner’s preferences and no systematic way for prisoners to have their preferences
satisfied. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, NO. 5100.08, PROGRAM
STATEMENT, at IV-3 (2006), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_
008.pdf (indicating that an inmate’s designation to a particular facility would include
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In Texas, convicted defendants can’t even ask for a particular
prison at sentencing; prisoners are assigned according to their sup64
posed needs. There is no formal way to “bargain” with the court or
65
with the prosecutor, and voluntary transfers are limited.
In California, there’s a limited amount of choice in jail assignment. Through “offender self-pay” programs, minimal-risk offenders
can, for a fee and with court approval, opt out of the regular jail sys66
tem and be housed in the jail equivalent of a “five-star Hilton,” where
they get distance from violent offenders, work furlough rights, and
67
sometimes even have the right to bring computer equipment. But
this California system is both unusual and inegalitarian.
Thus, under the standard regime, prisoners are assigned primarily
based on a state correctional employee’s judgment of available space
and inmate needs, such as proximity to family or appropriate treatment programs.

consideration of the specific institution or program recommended by the sentencing
court); id. at III-1 (advising the BOP to “follow[] the intentions of the [sentencing]
Court when designating a facility”); id. at III-3 to -4 (stating the BOP “make[s] every
effort” to follow the sentencing court’s recommendation); id. at IV-5 (“The court may
recommend a specific institution or a geographical region for a newly committed inmate.”); id. at V-3 (“When consistent with policies or when [the sentencing court’s
suggestions] are consistent with sound correctional management, the Bureau of Prisons attempts to satisfy judicial recommendations.”).
64
See TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, OFFENDER ORIENTATION HANDBOOK 6
(2004) (“Offenders do not have a right to choose their unit of assignment. Inter-Unit
transfers are based on departmental and offender needs. Offenders may not be transferred closer to home for visitation reasons.”). The Handbook does contemplate
“[t]ransfer requests for medical or educational reasons,” subject to approval by the relevant department head and the State Classification Committee. Id. at 6-7.
65
See id. (detailing various committees’ roles in the prison assignment process).
Inmates may request transfers because of problems or conflicts. Id. at 7. Such requests
should be made to “unit staff,” who will send the request to the Classification Committee, if the staff deems necessary. Id.
66
Jennifer Steinhauer, For $82 a Day, Booking a Cell in a 5-Star Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2007, at A1. Coincidentally, this sort of jail made the news when celebrity Paris Hilton, great-granddaughter of Hilton Hotels founder Conrad Hilton, was sentenced in
2007. See Laurie L. Levenson & Mary Gordon, The Dirty Little Secrets About Pay-to-Stay, 106
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67, 68-69 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/
assets/fi/106/levensongordon.pdf (describing public reaction to Hilton’s luxury imprisonment as “unequal justice”).
67
See Steinhauer, supra note 66 (reporting that offenders in paid prisons may in
some cases use personal music players and laptops); Geoffrey Segal, Innovative Alternatives
to Traditional Municipal/County Corrections, REASON FOUND. (Mar. 1, 2001), http://
reason.org/news/show/innovative-alternatives-to-tra-1 (describing public and private
self-pay programs in California as beneficial to low-risk inmates and city residents).
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Prison choice would supersede this mechanism. The process
would begin at conviction. The convicted defendant would receive a
coupon, good for incarceration for the duration of his term, which he
would be required to redeem at a participating prison (sorry, no
choice there). The set of participating prisons may or may not in68
clude private prisons. As I discuss below, choice is conceptually independent of privatization, and—even though some arguments for or
against vouchers are often made with private providers in mind—one
69
can discuss vouchers separately from privatization.
I’ve assumed above that everyone gets a voucher, but this needn’t
be the case. Some school choice plans only give vouchers to students
assigned to schools that are judged to be “failing” in some objective
70
sense; similarly, officials could do an initial round of nonconsensual
assignment and then give vouchers to prisoners at the “worst” prisons,
as determined by the Department of Corrections or Bureau of Prisons.
Imagine a convicted defendant awaiting sentencing, presumably
with a lot of time on his hands. The soon-to-be prisoner can spend his
time flipping through a book, perhaps like the Yellow Pages, with ads
for different prisons—or perhaps the browsing can be done online if
71
he has Internet access. To get an initial view of dimensions along
which prisons might compete, let’s take a more detailed look at some
of the problems prisoners face today. Each of the problems listed be72
low suggests possible reforms that inmates might find attractive.
73
Violence. Though good data is elusive, violence against inmates
by other inmates and by staff is a serious problem. This includes

68

I’m primarily envisioning this system operating within a single state—or within
the federal system, for federal prisons—but nothing inherently prevents out-of-state or
out-of-country prisons from participating, subject to governing laws in the origin and
destination jurisdictions.
69
See infra Section I.B.
70
For a discussion of the complexities of such a system in the education context, see
David N. Figlio & Marianne E. Page, Can School Choice and School Accountability Successfully
Coexist?, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 49 (Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2003).
71
On the availability of Internet access, see, for example, Greg Beato, You’ve Got Jail,
REASON.COM ( July, 2011), http://reason.com/archives/2011/06/24/youve-got-jail.
72
Prisons could advertise such reforms with color photos, supporting statistics,
and inmate testimonials. One blogger suggests: “Come to Pinal Country Prison,
where the guard beatings are minimal and shower sex assaults are a thing of the past.
Color-coded cells identify Black Panthers, [Aryan] Nation Skin Heads, and embezzling
tax accountants. Tattoo artist on duty. Sorry, no shanks allowed.” Lightning Bug’s
Butt, supra note 12. The proposal is sarcastic, but why not take it seriously?
73
There isn’t even reasonably complete and reliable data on conditions in prisons
nationwide. THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at

VOLOKH REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

796

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

2/15/2012 7:15 PM

[Vol.160: 779

prison riots, as well as “gang violence, rape, beatings by officers, and
74
in one large jail, a pattern of illegal and humiliating strip-searches.”
Overcrowding, idleness, and distance from family and community,
75
among other factors, fuel the violence in American prisons.
A prison in a voucher system might respond to this problem by
adopting a more effective security policy. This could include a “direct supervision” policy, which involves more face-to-face interactions
between inmates and correctional officers and tends to improve safety, rather than the “traditional model” in which guards supervise
76
prisoners from behind glass or bars. It could also include a focus on
conflict resolution and prevention rather than the present emphasis
on using force as “a ‘first strike’ response before other tactics are
77
considered or attempted.” Such a prison could make use of surveillance technology more broadly to “protect prisoners and staff from
violence and from false allegations of misconduct” to the extent that
this is consistent with inmates’ preferences for privacy, as well as non78
It could segregate
invasive drug- and weapon-detection devices.
populations that are particularly vulnerable to violence or rape—

17 (stating that present data “make[s] it impossible to get a complete picture of safety
and abuse in correctional facilities”).
74
Id. at 11-12. The data is better for deadly violence, that is homicides and suicides, than for nondeadly violence. In state prisons, there were 4 homicides and 14
suicides per 100,000 prisoners in 2002. Id. at 24. In local jails, there were 3 homicides
and 47 suicides per 100,000 prisoners in the same year. Id. For nondeadly violence,
“[a]ll we have are rough indicators”: over the course of 2000, “there were 34,355 reported assaults among prisoners in state and federal facilities and 17,952 reported assaults by prisoners against staff,” and in 2004, there were “4,252 recorded allegations of
sexual assault, misconduct, and harassment by prisoners and staff.” Id. However, official records may underestimate actual rates by perhaps a factor of five. Id.
On prison rape, see, for example, Combating Rape in Prisons: Little and Late, ECONOMIST, May 7, 2011, at 32 and Lovisa Stannow, Rape Factories, REASON, July 2011, at 54;
see also Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1, 2 & nn.1-6 (describing research on the rape of gay and transgender inmates).
75
THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 12. For
a news story on the link between overcrowding and violence, see The Fifth Circle of Hell,
ECONOMIST, July 16, 2011, at 40, which describes prison conditions in Venezuela.
76
See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 29.
77
Id. at 32.
78
Id. at 29-34.
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either identifiable populations like gay and transgender inmates or
80
a more broadly defined vulnerable class.
Health care. Correctional health care is inadequately funded, un81
derstaffed, and often provided by underqualified doctors. Moreover,
communicable diseases, such as staph infections, tuberculosis, hepati82
tis C, and HIV, are widespread. Care for the mentally ill in prisons
and jails—where rates of mental illness are two to four times higher
83
than among the general public—is likewise inadequate.

79

See Dolovich, supra note 74, at 4 (noting that “gay men and trans women detained in the [segregated unit of the L.A. County] Jail are relatively free from the sexual harassment and forced or coerced sexual conduct that can be the daily lot of sexual minorities in other men’s carceral facilities”).
80
See id. at 63, 73-82 (exploring ways to protect those vulnerable to sexual assault
in prison through targeted or general segregation methods). But see NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 (2009) (“The
Commission . . . discourages the creation of specialized units for vulnerable groups
and specifically prohibits housing prisoners based solely on their sexual orientation or
gender identity because it can lead to demoralizing and dangerous labeling.”). The
idea of sexual orientation–specific prisons might be in conflict with my suggestion below that prisons be required to take all applicants and accept by lottery if they’re oversubscribed. See infra text accompanying notes 130-31. But it could be consistent in a
variety of ways: (1) I also suggest that prisons could specialize in particular categories
of prisoners, and this might be one of them; they would then only be required to accept all comers within the category that they serve. (2a) The prison could serve all
comers but nonetheless have its own gay segregation wing. (2b) The prison might not
offer any particularly interesting services for those not in its gay segregation wing, so it
might not be particularly attractive to the population at large. But cf. infra notes 289-91
and accompanying text. In any event, the “accept all comers” rule is just one way of
running a voucher system. The “mutual choice” rule is another, though it presents
greater opportunities for cream skimming.
81
See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 38
(demonstrating the problems with correctional health care and offering solutions like
partnerships with health providers and screening for infectious diseases).
82
See id. at 47 (stating that among people released from prisons and jails in 1996,
over 1.3 million had hepatitis C and approximately 39.000 had AIDS).
83
See id. at 13 (describing the higher than average drug treatment, contagious disease treatment, and mental health needs of the prison population); id. at 39-40 (noting the challenges correctional facilities face in recruiting qualified medical staff,
which results in care by “unlicensed physicians, doctors with substance abuse problems, [and] doctors with criminal histories” (quoting Michael S. Vaughn & Leo Carroll, Separate and Unequal: Prison Versus Free-World Medical Care, 15 JUST. Q. 3, 3
(1998))); id. at 43-47 (discussing the prevalence rate of serious mental disorders in
jails and prisons, which is on average two-to-four times higher than among the general
population (citing 1 NAT’L COMM’N ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH
STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED INMATES 24 tbl.3-3, 25 fig.3-3 (2002))); see also
SpearIt, Mental Illness in Prison: Inmate Rehabilitation & Correctional Officers in Crisis, 14
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 277, 280-85 (2009) (detailing the deficiencies in California’s mental health programs for prisoners).
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A voucher prison could offer better medical care—including better screening, testing, and treatment of infectious diseases, and better
care for the mentally ill—better staffed facilities, more doctors and
nurses per inmate, and partnerships with community health-care providers. A voucher prison could also provide a variety of health insurance plans offering inmates the chance to opt out of the common
84
cost-control system that requires copayments for medical care.
High-security segregation. High-security segregation is overused, often on prisoners who pose little security risk or are mentally ill. Some
believe that such segregation is counterproductive because segregated
prisoners have reduced access to programming that could make them
85
more productive citizens when they reenter society.
A voucher prison could limit the use of high-security segregation,
have secure therapeutic units for mentally ill prisoners, and offer
more human contact and dedicated programs to inmates in segregation. These prisons could also develop individualized plans to transfer
high-security prisoners to the general prison population near the end
86
of their sentences to prepare them for release.
Correctional officers. Correctional officers are often underqualified
and insufficiently trained to resolve problems without violence. Although learning to treat prisoners with respect is a valuable skill that
helps maintain security and control, the idea is undervalued in officer
87
training. A voucher prison could (perhaps through higher wages

84

See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 4849 (arguing that state legislatures should revoke existing laws that require prisoner copayments because such payments cause prisoners with legitimate medical concerns to
forego or delay treatment).
85
See, e.g., id. at 55 (citing COMM. OF MASS. GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CORR. REFORM, STRENGTHENING PUBLIC SAFETY, INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY, AND INSTITUTING FISCAL REPONSIBILITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION (2004)); JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY (2003); Hans
Toch, The Future of Supermax Confinement, 81 PRISON J. 376 (2001); David Lovell &
Clark Johnson, Felony and Violent Recidivism Among Supermax Prison Inmates in
Washington State: A Pilot Study (Apr. 19, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.son.washington.edu/faculty/fac-page-files/LovellSupermaxRecidivism4-19-04.pdf; see also Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009, at 36, 40
(documenting the destructive psychological effects of long-term solitary confinement
and suggesting that such treatment amounts to torture and is counterproductive to the
reintegration of released offenders).
86
See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 5253 (describing how the misuse and overuse of segregation work against rehabilitation
and threaten public safety).
87
See id. at 15, 66-73 (suggesting improvements such as promoting a culture of
mutual respect and recruiting a diverse work force); see also SpearIt, supra note 83, at
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and better training) recruit a more highly qualified and diverse staff
88
with lower turnover and higher morale.
These are only a few possibilities. Here are some more:
 A prison could offer improvements over existing services,
like better gym equipment, more diverse television
89
programming, Internet access, or help with writing legal
90
petitions.
 A prison could offer better programming, such as high91
school and college-level education, job training or opportunities for voluntary inmate labor, partnerships with
92
post-release job placement programs, counseling, and
93
other rehabilitative programs.
 The prison could also adopt policies that might be expected to yield better results in the long run—one exam94
ple is “merit pay” for the prison warden.
95
 A prison could offer more space per inmate.

290-93 (reviewing the mental health training provided to correctional officiers in the
California prison system and finding it lacking).
88
Cf. THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 7073 (citing low pay, demanding hours, inadequate benefits, and stress as obstacles to
instilling morale and professionalism in correctional officers).
89
On Internet access, see, for example, Beato, supra note 71, at 16.
90
Cf. Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the
Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 291-96 (2010) (advocating that attorneys ghostwrite petitions for pro se prisoners).
91
See Gregory A. Knott, Cost and Punishment: Reassessing Incarceration Costs and the
Value of College-in-Prison Programs, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript
at 19), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649164 (describing the recent rise in
interest for such programs)
92
For a study of the effectiveness of one such program, see CINDY REDCROSS ET
AL., WORK AFTER PRISON: ONE-YEAR FINDINGS FROM THE TRANSITIONAL JOBS REENTRY
DEMONSTRATION 88-89 (2010). This follow-up report on prison-to-work program participants one year later found an increase in temporary, transitional jobs, but few permanent placements and a minimal effect on recidivism.
93
See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 2729 (advocating prison rehabilitation programs that reduce violence and change behavior); see also A New Deal, ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 2008, at 36 (discussing the success of a
Texas rehabilitation program that teaches entrepreneurship skills).
94
Such a scheme might tie the warden’s salary negatively to later recidivism. See
Hills, supra note 30; see also Max Taylor & Ken Pease, Private Prisons and Penal Purpose
(advocating that a “no reconviction” bonus be written into private prison contracts), in
PRIVATIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 179, 189-90 (Roger Matthews ed., 1989); James Slack,
We’ll Pay Jail Governors to Cut Reoffending, Say Tories, DAILY MAIL (Eng.), Oct. 8, 2008, at
39, available at 2008 WLNR 19151823 (describing the implementation of “super governors” who are paid more for each convict who does not reoffend after release).
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A prison could facilitate family visits by “providing ample
96
space and time, and even assisting with transportation.”
A prison could provide cheaper telephone calling plans
that would allow more frequent communication between
97
inmates and their families.
A prison could be located closer to inmates’ home com98
munities.
A prison could institute an independent system of external monitoring with meaningful enforcement, perhaps
through a nongovernmental organization modeled after
the International Committee of the Red Cross, which
“carries out inspections of detention facilities in conflict
99
zones worldwide.” Implementation of this system might
involve encouraging politicians, judges, citizens, the media, and nongovernmental organizations to visit prisons
100
and interview prisoners and staff.
A prison could develop a meaningful internal grievance
system, where complaints are confidential, inmates get
copies of their grievances, and prisoners and guards are
101
protected from retaliation.
A prison could seek accreditation from the American Correctional Association (ACA), develop its own standards, or
102
adopt another organization’s standards.
A prison could allow inmates to sue it—at least in state
103
court and on contract grounds—regardless of the PLRA.

See THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 23,
26-27 (arguing that reducing prison overcrowding will reduce violence).
96
Id. at 36.
97
See id. at 36-37 (explaining that prisoners pay more for phone service because
prisons use telecommunications contracts to generate income).
98
See id. at 35-36 (arguing that incarcerating offenders closer to their homes will
improve family and community bonds, which improve the chances that a prisoner will
succeed after release).
99
Id. at 82.
100
See id. at 79-82, 95-99 (advocating external monitoring as a mechanism for improving prisoner safety and curbing abuse).
101
See id. at 92-94 (discussing the importance of a meaningful grievance system as a
source of institutional knowledge and as a commitment to procedural justice).
102
See id. at 88-90 (reviewing and criticizing current standards of professional accountability); see also Developments, supra note 40, at 1888-90 (discussing standards and
performance-based measures that could be used to measure prison quality). But see
Dolovich, supra note 39, at 488-90 (expressing skepticism about the ACA’s willingness
to engage in reform of accreditation standards).
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None of these policies requires vouchers. Any could be adopted by
reform-minded legislatures or correctional agencies. Perhaps they all
should be. The problem, though, is that (rightly or wrongly) they haven’t been. Many reforms are costly; people don’t like inmates, so
104
they hesitate to implement reforms that would improve prison life;
105
and bureaucracies are slow to change.
Many of these policies would be costly for voucher prisons as well.
Prisons that adopted such changes would tend to make less profit per
inmate. But if inmates value the change enough, the prisons could
make up for the lower per-inmate profit by attracting more inmates.
Prisons could also bundle a valued but costly change with a reduction in
other amenities. For instance, a prison with better medical care or a
prison that abolished copayments might locate in cheaper areas further
106
from the inmates’ communities or might offer less programming.
The inmate’s choice would be limited by security level (minimum,
medium, or maximum) and gender. There may also be certain mandatory conditions attached to the voucher. For example, a sexual offender might be required to go to a prison with appropriate programs. Additionally, mentally ill prisoners may be incapable of chooschoosing themselves. But even for the mentally ill, the person who
chooses the prison need not be a Department of Corrections bureaucrat. The inmate’s family or an appointed legal guardian could make
the choice.
Having made his choice, the convicted defendant would be sent to
his requested prison, subject to availability. A prison system may want
to guarantee a spot in certain units to certain prisoners: those with
particular physical or mental illnesses may need special accommodation, and a gang member who has informed on his gang may have to
107
be sent to a “snitch farm” to avoid reprisals. As with schools, popu-

103

For prospective relief, the PLRA only covers proceedings “arising under Federal
law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) (2006). Litigation over contract provisions wouldn’t arise
under federal law unless the contract explicitly incorporated federal law. Moreover,
while the PLRA does regulate consent decrees, id. § 3626(c)(1), it doesn’t regulate private settlements, id. § 3626(c)(2), or state law remedies, id. § 3626(d). The exhaustion
provisions only apply to suits brought under § 1983 or § 1997e(a). Id. § 1997e(e). It
does not apply to suits brought under a contract, and the limitations on recovery for
mental or emotional injury only apply to federal civil actions. Id.
104
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
105
See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
106
For bundles that include a waiver of constitutional rights, see infra Section II.B.
107
See, e.g., KNOX, supra note 21, at 445-46 (describing the protections “snitch
farms” provide including anonymity, physical isolation, and visual security); George W.
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lar prisons will have waiting lists, which—provided the voucher
amount is high enough—would provide an incentive for the prison to
108
increase its capacity. This growth would be easier because a voucher
prison wouldn’t need permission to accept new prisoners if it ex109
pands, aside from any necessary local construction permits.
Once a prisoner is in a minimally acceptable place, he may want
to stay, perhaps because of social connections he has forged in prison.
Therefore, it makes sense to offer the choice before incarceration begins. But because prisoners may not have enough information to
make a good choice before they’ve served any time, the voucher system should offer at least one transfer after a fixed time period, so that
prisoners can effectively punish a low-quality prison. Alternatively,
there could be transfer possibilities at regular intervals—like open enrollment periods for health plans or the natural reenrollment periods
in schools based on the school year. One could even imagine transfers at will, though this would involve greater administrative and
110
transportation costs.
111
Current policies on involuntary transfers could still be used in the
same way as before, for instance to fight gang activity or otherwise to

Knox, The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups (STG’s) in American Prisons Today:
A Special NGCRC Report, J. GANG RES., Fall 2004, at 1, 15 (stating that only 14.5% of
wardens surveyed indicated that their state provided a separate facility for informants);
see also Dolovich, supra note 74, at 77-78 (describing the California prison system’s
“sensitive needs yards,” designed for “likely victims of prison violence,” including “gang
dropouts, sex offenders, prison informants (i.e., ‘snitches’), and anyone else who requests protective custody”).
108
The idea that a prison would want to have more inmates is key. Cf. Ladd, supra
note 1, at 70 (“[S]uccessful schools will be reluctant to expand if doing so requires
lowering the average socioeconomic or ability level of their students.”). Requiring
prisons to take all comers, and accept inmates by lottery if they are oversubscribed, is
thus an important feature. See infra Section I.C.
109
Local communities are often eager for the business. See Dolovich, supra note
39, at 539-42 (noting rural community support of prison building as a sustainable form
of economic development); Eric J. Williams, The Big House in a Small Town: Prisons,
Communities, and Economics in Rural America 5 (Apr. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/=1580533 (same).
110
Furthermore, frequent transfers may reduce the incentives that inmates have to
cooperate with staff and other inmates.
111
Prisons may, for instance, transfer inmates to relieve overcrowding. See Brandon v. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., 938 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Alaska 1997) (discussing the process
by which Alaska solicited inmates to be transferred to other states to relieve overcrowding). Involuntary transfers have been held not to implicate a liberty interest under the
Due Process Clause. See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (holding that
there is no due process right to pretransfer hearing); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,
228 (1976) (holding that the Due Process Clause is not implicated in every change in
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112

maintain safety. (But the more frequent involuntary transfers are, the
less attractive the ability to choose one’s initial assignment will be.)
B. Choice Is Not the Same as Privatization
113

As I’ve mentioned above, arguments about choice are often
merged with arguments about privatization. Privatization skeptics
thus may also be skeptics about choice, but this needn’t be the case.
In the school choice debate, a prominent question has been
114
whether religious schools should be allowed to participate.
This
question presumes that the school choice plan includes private
schools since a religious public school would obviously be unconstitutional. More generally, arguments for school choice often include arguments in favor of private schools. This is because the factors that
are claimed to make choice work—chiefly, flexibility, cost savings, and
responsiveness to market incentives—are claimed to be more present
115
in the private than in the public sector.
But choice needn’t have anything to do with private provision.
These are logically distinct policies.
First, imagine the following scenarios, but ignore private providers.
 Without choice, everyone could be assigned to a particular
public school, perhaps their local one. This also describes
the current system of incarceration in states without pris116
on privatization, as well as state-funded indigent defense
117
in most jurisdictions.
confinement conditions). In contrast, a due process liberty interest is implicated when
an inmate is transferred to a mental hospital. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-93 (1980).
112
See infra text accompanying notes 354-56; see also Muhammad v. Carlson, 845
F.2d 175, 179 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding involuntary transfer to AIDS unit); Philip Ellenbogen, Beyond the Border: A Comparative Look at Prison Rape in the United States and
Canada, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 335, 371 (2009) (proposing a protective process
including involuntary transfer for rape victims).
113
See supra text accompanying note 69.
114
See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that a state may exclude ministry education from a publicly funded college scholarship plan); Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002) (holding that a state may include religious
schools in a publicly funded voucher plan).
115
In the prison context, see Charles W. Thomas, Correctional Privatization in America: An Assessment of Its Historical Origins, Present Status, and Future Prospects (characterizing private firms as more flexibile and open to change than government agencies), in
CHANGING THE GUARD: PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE CONTROL OF CRIME 57, 93 (Alexander Tabarrok ed., 2003).
116
Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,
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Alternatively, one could have a choice program within the
public system alone, for example, one that offered vouch118
Magnet and charter
ers limited to public schools.
schools are also a form of public school choice.
Now suppose some services are provided privately.
 Even then, one could have privatization without choice.
For instance, a private company, like Edison Learning
(formerly Edison Schools), could become the superinten119
dent of an existing, choiceless public school system.
This structure is also evident in the W-2 program for wel120
fare in Wisconsin, the current prison privatization re121
gime, assigned private counsel for indigent defend122
ants, and a regional health facility to which Arizona has
delegated the entirety of its health care responsibilities
123
under the Medicaid statute.
 Alternatively, one could have choice within a regime of
partly or wholly private provision. Food stamps are a classic example of such a program since the government plays

Rhode Island, Utah, and West Virginia have no prisoners in private facilities.
HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ
23167, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 34 app. tbl.20 (2010).
117
See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 102 & n.93 (noting that most jurisdictions do not allow the indigent to select defense counsel from among those eligible).
118
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 7225–7225g (2006); CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, SCHOOL CHOICE: A SPECIAL REPORT, at xvi, 1-2, 29-62
(1992) (arguing for choice to be limited to the public school system); Richard D.
Kahlenberg, Public School Choice: Student Achievement, Integration, Democracy, and Public
Support (similar), in PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE VS. PRIVATE SCHOOL VOUCHERS 137, 13752 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2003).
119
See, e.g., Reitz, supra note 45, at 108-10 (discussing Edison’s management of
schools in Philadelphia); see also, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832 (1982)
(discussing a state-funded private school specializing in the education of special-needs
students referred by public school districts or the Department of Mental Health);
Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that the
school district did not operate schools, but contracted secondary education to “a privately operated high school in the district”).
120
See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 138588 (2003) (reviewing the growing privatization of welfare systems using Wisconsin as
the primary example).
121
Developments, supra note 40, at 1867.
122
See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 92-96 (reviewing the assigned counsel approach to indigent defendants); see also HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD
165-66 (Warner Books 1982) (1960) (discussing an attorney’s appointment to represent an indigent criminal defendant).
123
See J.K. ex rel. R.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 697-99 (D. Ariz. 1993).
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no significant role in food distribution.
Consider also
125
drug or alcohol abuse rehabilitation and traffic school,
where defendants are sentenced to the program but can
then choose (with or without government funding)
among a range of providers, many of which are private. In
England, Wales, and Ontario, indigent defendants choose
126
their own private defense attorneys using public funds.
And, of course, school choice proposals often include private schools.
This last option of choice with at least partial private provision is the
one imagined most often, and so I’ll primarily use private-sector exam127
ples.
But it should be clear that we can have privatization without
choice and choice without privatization. All four possible schemes exist
in the real world. Thus, choice is an option, whether in schools, prisons, or elsewhere, even if one is hostile to private provision.
C. Funding
As with school vouchers, the prison voucher amount simply could
be a percentage of the average cost of incarceration at public pris128
ons.
If the program is to include private prisons, the percentage
124

See Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1447 (2003) (discussing the evolution from direct to indirect
provision of food subsidies to the poor).
125
See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 881-82 (7th
Cir. 2003) (concerning public funding of a private halfway house).
126
Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 110 & nn.123-24 (noting jurisdictions
where an indigent defendant may choose his own counsel).
127
Note, though, that nonprofit prisons may also be an option. See Daniel L. Low,
Nonprofit Private Prisons: The Next Generation of Prison Management, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 5-8 (2003) (proposing nonprofit prisons as an option for
reform); Richard Moran, Op-Ed., A Third Option: Nonprofit Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
1997, at 23 (opining on the benefits of prison management by nonprofit foundations).
For discussions of the advantages of nonprofit schools, see Byron W. Brown, Why Governments Run Schools, 11 ECON. EDUC. REV. 287, 293-96 (1992), and John Morley, Note,
For-Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools: An Agency Cost Approach, 115 YALE L.J. 1782, 1795810 (2006).
128
In school voucher plans, the value of the voucher is set at a percentage below
one-hundred percent of per-pupil expenditure. See JOHN MERRIFIELD, CATO INST.,
POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 616, DISMAL SCIENCE: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF U.S. SCHOOL
CHOICE RESEARCH AND HOW TO ADDRESS THEM 46 (2008) (explaining that in “optiondemand” programs, school vouchers are worth less than the public schools’ per-pupil
funding); Hoxby, supra note 1, at 15 (“[T]he typical voucher in the US is worth between 14 and 29 percent of per-pupil expenditure in the local public schools.”). Public school funding and voucher funding are typically separate, so if someone switches
from a public to a private school, the private school gets the voucher amount, but the
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would have to be high enough to induce enough prisons to participate in order to yield meaningful competition.
The voucher amount could be determined in more complicated
ways. The amount could be determined by an inmate-specific formula
based on as many observable characteristics of the inmate as are per129
missible to consider, such as disability level, sex, age, security level,
nature of the crime, known psychological or medical conditions, and
130
known history of violence.
The voucher amount also could vary with the prison at which it is
redeemed. The amount might depend on how many inmates the
prison already has. Thus, if initial inmates are expensive but additional inmates (up to some limit related to the capacity of the prison)
are less costly to serve, the voucher amount at a prison could start
high and decline as the number of inmates increases. But this approach would have costs of its own: it would require that the government monitor prisons’ costs to ensure honest pricing, and it would
discourage the expansion of successful prisons by penalizing prisons
with more inmates.
Before talking further about funding, we should determine how
prisons should be able to pick and choose among inmates, if they
should be able to do so at all. Clearly, all prisons can’t choose the inmates they prefer because they might all reject the same inmates.
Consequently, there must be at least one prison of last resort, perhaps
a public prison, although one could imagine a private firm willing to
serve in this capacity. If some prisons can choose, they’ll probably be
better informed than the government about the characteristics of the
inmate, if for no other reason than that some factors that are probably
correlated with the cost of incarceration, like race, may well be impermissible for the government to include in the voucherpublic school’s funding doesn’t decrease by the amount of the voucher. See id. For a
discussion of the importance of the voucher amount for the participation of multiple
providers, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 569. Of course, the percentage is endogenous to each school voucher program. See infra text accompanying note 380.
129
For a discussion of how the analogous issue of special education would fare under school choice, with stress on the need to fund special education adequately to induce schools to compete for such students, see Julie Berry Cullen & Steven G. Rivkin,
The Role of Special Education in School Choice, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE,
supra note 70, at 67, 69-70, 98-101.
130
The school voucher program at issue in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris provided a
percentage of private-school tuition up to a cap, with the percentage varying according
to family income. 536 U.S. 646, 639 (2002); see also Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note
8, at 113-17 (discussing alternate funding mechanisms for indigent defense, including
lump-sum payments and hourly rates).
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determination formula. Thus these prisons will consider more factors
than those used in the formula that determines the voucher amount.
Prisons that can choose will systematically reject inmates with insufficient vouchers, placing the burden of incarcerating these inmates
on the prison of last resort. Perhaps in future rounds of voucheramount determination, the government will be able to correct past mistakes, but in general, voucher prisons will have an advantage over the
government in determining the true cost of incarcerating an inmate.
Therefore, it may make sense to require participating prisons to
take all comers, with a lottery system used to admit prisoners if the
prison has a waiting list. Prisons might still be allowed to serve particular categories of persons—a company might specialize in women’s
prisons, or prisons for inmates with particular medical or psychological problems—but at least within those categories, prisons shouldn’t
be able to pick and choose accepted inmates. In this scenario, the only burden on the government is to make the voucher amount for each
prisoner category generous enough that, on average, inmates in that
category are worthwhile for private prisons to incarcerate.
So far, I have assumed that the voucher amount—however determined—for a particular type of inmate at a given prison is a flat fee.
But voucher amounts could be even more complicated. As an alternative to a flat fee, one could imagine a “per service” voucher amount,
where the government pays a fee that varies with the number of medical visits, disruptions, etc. However, assuming the per-service amount
is generous enough to exceed the cost of providing the service, this
type of system would give prisons incentives to oversupply the service
and in turn require the government to incur heavy monitoring costs
131
to avoid having to pay for too many unnecessary services.
I only mention alternatives to flat fees to illustrate the variety of
conceivable funding schemes. From now on I’ll assume that vouchers

131

Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 116-17 (discussing an “hourly-rate”
approach to indigent defense and explaining the drawbacks to such a scheme, including costly government monitoring). Another possibility would be to institute an auction system, in which prisons would bid on each prisoner, who would then be issued a
voucher sufficient to cover a certain number of bids. For instance, if prison A is willing
to handle prisoner X for $30/day, prison B would require $35/day, prison C would require $40/day, and prison D would require $45/day, prisoner X could be issued a
voucher worth $40/day and would be allowed to choose among prisons A, B, and C.
An auction system would allow prisons to reject inmates while still allowing for competition. But this might be too complicated from an administrative standpoint and
would also require a prison of last resort in case all prisons demanded a fee that the
government considered excessive.
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are structured as a flat fee and that prisons are unable to reject inmates who fall within the category the prison serves.
The voucher would replace the current arrangements by which
private prisons are reimbursed. If an inmate chooses a particular
prison, the prison gains the voucher amount as revenue, and, if the
inmate transfers out, the prison loses that amount.
For public prisons, the financial impact of the gain or loss of a
prisoner is less clear. Public schools under voucher plans often continue to be funded out of general revenues, without any explicit ac132
counting of how many students attend the school. Whether a public
school loses money when it loses a voucher student to a private school
depends on the details of the school finance system. Some school
voucher plans are structured so that public schools don’t suffer at all
133
from losing students. In school systems with “pseudo-choice plans,”
successful schools experienced a fall in funding because “money does
not follow students or so little money follows students that a school
134
The
accepting an extra student cannot cover its marginal costs.”
public-prison funding system under a voucher system should probably
avoid such perverse incentives. If public schools, or prisons, don’t lose
money when they lose “customers,” we shouldn’t expect competition
135
to improve the quality of the public system. Not reducing the public
system’s funding when people leave also increases the total cost of the
136
system; on the other hand, an argument in favor of such a system is
that it might be a political concession to public employees. I would
suggest that public and private prisons be funded by vouchers in the
same way, with each individual prisoner in the prison associated with a
specified funding amount.

132

Hoxby, supra note 1, at 18. Competition is further hindered because “schools are
not able to enter, expand, contract, or exit [or] schools need to seek approval or financial support from other schools with which they are supposed to compete.” Id.; see also id.
at 24 (explaining that most school choice reforms failed to satisfy competitive criteria
where perverse incentives were created); infra text accompanying notes 135, 143.
133
Hoxby, supra note 1, at 18.
134
Id.
135
See id. at 18 n.1 (discussing the failure of these types of plans and the lack of
incentives they provide to schools to improve).
136
But cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 113 (noting that a pure lumpsum indigent defense voucher system “would cost no more than the prior system of
representation”).
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The analogy with schools or food stamps suggests that prisoners
137
could be allowed to supplement their voucher with their own funds,
but this probably isn’t a good idea on ethical grounds—I’ve noted the
138
inegalitarianism of California’s “offender self-pay” program —despite
139
its possible efficiency benefits.
D. Statutory Restrictions
Suppose the prison choice plan includes private prisons. What
regulations would govern them? We may focus on two possibilities:
 anyone may establish a prison, subject to certain security
140
requirements; or,
 the government may choose who may operate a prison,
but the allocation of prisoners to prisons would proceed
141
by choice rather than by bureaucratic assignment.
By analogy to schools, one could imagine a system of “charter
prisons,” prisons that are public but that have significant independ142
ence from the Department of Corrections.
Like charter schools,
charter prisons could operate without regard to the presence of pri-

137

The school program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris only covered a portion of tuition, leaving parents responsible for a copayment. 536 U.S. 639, 646 (2002).
138
See supra text accompanying note 66-67.
139
Cf. John R. Lott, Jr., Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?, 30 ECON.
INQ. 583, 586-99 (1992) (arguing that the rich already face the highest expected penalties, even when lower conviction rates are taken into account, because of the great effect of conviction on their future earnings); John R. Lott, Jr., Should the Wealthy Be Able
to “Buy Justice”?, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1307, 1310 (1987) (arguing that it may be efficient for
the rich to reduce their probability of criminal conviction through payment for highquality legal services). There may also be retributive value in letting the rich off more
lightly, if one wants to equalize the “subjective experience of punishment” and if rich
people are, on average, more sensitive because they’re more accustomed to luxurious
lifestyles. See Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
182, 230-35 (2009) (explaining that if one accepts that people suffer in proportion to
their blameworthiness, then rich people deserve a “subjectively equal but objectively
less severe punishment” than poor people). But see Martin H. Pritikin, Fine-Labor: The
Symbiosis Between Monetary and Work Sanctions, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 343, 353 (2010) (justifying sanctions based on income and wealth because they “help ensure a proportionate impact on all offenders”).
140
Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 112-17 (noting that in “voucher
models” of indigent defense, legal service providers could be public or private, provided that they comply with certain threshold requirements and ethical standards).
141
Cf. id. at 101-12 (explaining that in an indigent defense “deregulation” scheme,
the government would continue to designate public defenders, but each defendant
could choose his own defense counsel).
142
See Hoxby, supra note 1, at 15-17.
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vate providers. This could increase the possibility that choice within
143
the public system will improve public prisons.
Once the universe of providers is determined as above, prisons
could be governed by most of the same statutes and regulations that
currently exist. However, one sort of statute that may now be moot
would be the sort that requires private prisons to achieve particular
144
cost savings or quality improvements relative to public prisons. The
quality improvement requirement would be replaced by prisoner
choice. Quality would no longer be defined by an externally imposed
145
yardstick (like the Logan quality of confinement index ), and each
prison could pursue its own vision of quality, just as each prisoner
could have his own view of what constitutes quality. Litigation over
quality, like floor space assignments or grievance procedures, would
become contractual disputes. Arguably, this would benefit prisoners
because they would be in a better position to litigate as contractual
146
partners than as prisoners.
Nonetheless, just as the government requires minimum standards
147
for private schools, nothing prevents quality regulations from serving as a floor. There may also be a role for continuing monitoring to
prevent prisons from reneging on the promises they make in their advertising. Shady, venal, incompetent, and sadistic operators will, after
all, always be with us, even in the presence of competitive markets. In
many competitive markets, consumer choice, litigation, and word of
mouth are sufficient to keep such operators in line. If these mechanisms work well for prisons, so much the better; but given that inmates are stuck in their prison at least for a while, that a bad prison
experience is worse than a bad hotel stay, and that prisoners’ com-

143

Cf. supra text accompanying note 140-41.
See Developments, supra note 40, at 1873 n.38 (citing statutes requiring private
prisons to attain numerical cost and quality targets).
145
See RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 11315 (1997) (describing Charles Logan’s factors for assessing prison quality, such as security, activity, and justice); see also Developments, supra note 40, at 1889-90 (advocating
performance-based contracts and suggesting the Logan index, among other possibilities, as a measure of performance).
146
The possibility that courts might be less deferential to private prisons may partly
explain this. But conceivably litigation with a public prison might also be contractbased. See Developments, supra note 40, at 1879-83 (addressing the legal accountability
of private prisons in comparison to public prisons in light of the immunity exceptions
for the latter).
147
See, e.g., E. Vance Randall, Private Schools and State Regulation, 24 URB. LAW. 341,
369-70 (1992) (evaluating the efficiency of private-school regulation).
144
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plaints aren’t always credible, it may be better to err on the side of
greater market policing.
Under a voucher system, there is also an argument for government regulation to provide a ceiling for quality, lest prisons become so
good from the prisoners’ perspectives that prison’s deterrent value is
reduced. Similarly, increases in “quality” (from the prisoners’ perspectives) that are socially harmful will also have to be regulated. But
148
more on this later.
As for cost savings, this requirement is probably unnecessary because there’s already a strong incentive to cut costs under any fixed149
reimbursement scheme.
In addition, the government can reduce
the voucher amount if it believes there’s sufficient competition for
prisoners at a given voucher amount.
The voucher system could also change how prisons enter, exit,
contract, and expand. Currently, private prison firms win contracts
and then build prisons to fulfill these contracts, or build the prisons in
150
advance, hoping to win the contracts to use them. Under a voucher
151
system, firms would still need to get local building or zoning permis152
sion, but otherwise they’d only need to convince the prisoners themselves. As noted above, and assuming the market worked correctly,
popular prisons would have waiting lists and be able to expand without
having to ask permission from the Department of Corrections, while

148

See infra text accompanying note 361.
See Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to
Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1152-54 (1997) (discussing the incentives of private providers to cut costs compared to their public counterparts); Developments, supra note 40,
at 1875-77 (presenting data from three studies showing cost savings in privatization
and roughly comparable quality to public prisons). But see MCDONALD ET AL., supra
note 40, at 33-34 (arguing that private prisons may not save money, but that current
empirical studies are inadequate to test the proposition); Brad W. Lundahl et al., Prison Privatization: A Meta-Analysis of Cost and Quality of Confinement Indicators, 19 RES. ON
SOC. WORK PRAC. 383, 393 (2009) (finding that cost savings from privatization appear
minimal).
150
See Thomas, supra note 115, at 87 (“In 1998 . . . CCA assessed the need for prisoner housing space . . . to be so great that it committed more than $100 million of private capital to construct a 2,304-bed medium-security prison . . . without any contract
that guaranteed the utilization of the facility.”).
151
Whether entrance and exit is as easy as expansion and contraction of existing
facilities depends on whether we’re in a “voucher” or “deregulation” model. See supra
notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
152
See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
149
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153

unpopular prisons would contract or close.
I discuss the constitutional regime that would govern voucher prisons immediately below.
II. VOUCHERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FLEXIBILITY
In this Part, I explain how prison vouchers would increase prisons’
constitutional flexibility in two ways. First, they would make faithbased prisons—which, as currently constituted, likely violate the Establishment Clause—fully constitutional. Second, even though prisons
are always state actors and must respect inmates’ constitutional rights,
a voucher regime would give prisons somewhat greater leeway to offer
inmates valued benefits in exchange for the waiver of some constitu154
tional rights.
A. The Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prisons
Faith-based prisons today face a number of constitutional hurdles:
depending on the program, faith-based prisons may have the effect of
advancing religion, either through funding or through mere endorsement; they may “coerce” religious practice by offering greater
benefits within the religious program; and they may delegate governmental power to religious organizations. Avoiding these problems
might be possible, but it would be difficult.
But under vouchers, these problems would largely disappear.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris establishes that, when money is funneled to
religious providers by the independent choice of beneficiaries, there
155
Coeris no government advancement or endorsement of religion.
cion and delegation become moot when inmates choose freely among
a wide range of providers chosen without reference to religion.
1. Religious Effects
One way that the government can inappropriately advance religion is by reimbursing the religious organization’s expenses. For direct reimbursement to be constitutional, the organization’s program
153

Cf. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(i) (2006) (stating that a failing school can be
closed down and reopened as a public charter school). Of course, arrangements
would have to be made for the prisoners incarcerated in a prison that is closing, but
this is no different from the issues presented under the current system when a private
prison goes bankrupt.
154
For a more developed version of this argument, see Volokh, Constitutional Possibilities, supra note 12, at 1006-10.
155
536 U.S. 639, 652-53 (2002).
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156

can’t be dominated by religious material. The aid has to be “offered
to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their reli157
gion.” And the criteria for choosing the programs cannot be related
158
to religion. Even a small number of programs could be prohibitively
resource intensive, especially if they are residential.
All these problems would no longer be relevant under a voucher
system. Direct reimbursement wouldn’t be an issue anymore, so religious content wouldn’t need to be diluted. Vouchers would fall within the permissive scope of Zelman, because inmates, not prisons or
program providers, would receive the benefits. Provided the voucher
would be available to any prison that provided adequate security or
otherwise satisfied certain technical requirements, neutral choice of
providers would be automatic.
Vouchers would also solve the resource problem. Because inmates could select one prison over another, the choice available to
them would span the entire system, even if each prison had no more
than one religious program. Therefore, no prison would be obligated
to offer multiple programs.
“Endorsement” is not limited to monetary aid. But under Zelman,
vouchers cure any endorsement: in a voucher program, the “incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of
a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient,
159
not to the government.”
Finally, one might wonder whether Zelman applies to prisons,
160
which, unlike schools, are always state actors under the “traditional
161
If the government itself can’t teach any
public function” doctrine.
religious doctrine as true, why can a private religious prison? The
156

See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 88-89 (2005) (“[T]eaching about the truth or falsity of particular
religious commitments, or encouraging (or discouraging) faith in particular beliefs,
crosses the constitutional line into impermissible indoctrination.”).
157
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion).
158
See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 207-12 (1948) (finding
a constitutional violation where a public school hosted teachers of specific religions who
offered voluntary weekly religion classes, even though a secular alternative was available).
159
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added).
160
See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-43 (1982) (illustrating that a
school for maladjusted students operating principally on public funds is not a state actor in the employment context).
161
See, e.g., Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 460-61 (5th Cir.
2003) (“Private prison-management companies and their employees are subject to
§ 1983 liability because they are performing a government function traditionally reserved to the state.”).
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state action doctrine shows us how to solve this problem: when state
action is found in a particular context, it doesn’t mean that the actor
is a state actor in all contexts. Rather, a finding of state action means
162
that the particular action is “fairly attributable to the State” or
163
“chargeable to the State,” and that the state is “responsible for the
164
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.”
Because private prisons fulfill the exclusively public function of
incarceration, their incarcerative functions, like restricting prisoners’
freedoms and meting out punishment, constitute state action. But in
165
a voucher system, their offer of religious services does not.
2. Coercion
Though faith-based prison programs are voluntary, modern Establishment Clause doctrine nonetheless prohibits them as “coercive” if
166
they involve “subtle coercive pressure,” or if they force participants
167
to make a “difficult choice” and “forfeit . . . benefits as the price of
168
resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.”
169
Programs that offer “a better possibility of parole” or reduced
170
security restrictions may be coercive. A great enough quality difference might be coercive, but this is less likely if vouchers are used,
171
since Zelman already requires, for “true private choice,” that the sec172
ular options be “adequate substitutes” for the religious options, even
173
if they might “not be superior . . . in every respect.”
The doctrine thus contains a built-in mechanism to prevent secular options from becoming too unattractive. Moreover, the government could fulfill its secular-quality maintenance duty differently un162

Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
Id. at 937.
164
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
165
For further discussion of the state action doctrine as related to prison vouchers,
see Volokh, Constitutional Possibilities, supra note 12, at 1006-10.
166
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
167
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000).
168
Lee, 505 U.S. at 596.
169
Richard R.W. Fields, Perks for Prisoners Who Pray: Using the Coercion Test to Decide
Establishment Clause Challenges to Faith-Based Prison Units, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 541, 561.
170
See Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that “classification
to a higher security risk category” if an inmate didn’t attend a religious program was a
severe enough penalty to amount to coercion).
171
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
172
Id. at 670 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
173
Id.
163
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der a voucher system than it does today. No longer will the government have to guarantee attractive options at the same prison; because of
inmate choice, the government needs merely to ensure that, systemwide, the secular system is sufficiently comparable.
The government could fulfill this requirement by running a system of secular public prisons. But even in a world where the government disengages from private provision and where all prisons are private voucher operations, the government could still fulfill its duty by
contracting with prisons to accommodate prisoners who want an adequate secular alternative.
3. Delegation of Governmental Power
Delegation may also be problematic. A religious organization’s
management of a residential wing of a prison might violate the Establishment Clause because it could “enmesh[] churches in the exercise
174
of substantial governmental powers,” which would independently
violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court has most prominently used this doctrine in two cases. First, in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den,
it struck down a Massachusetts statute allowing churches to veto liquor
175
the
license applications for establishments located near a church:
Establishment Clause forbids an arrangement whereby “important,
discretionary governmental powers” are “delegated to or shared with
176
religious institutions.” Next, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet, the Court struck down a New York statute
drawing a special school district to coincide with an insular religious
177
The Court held that the statute “allocat[ed] political
community.
178
power on a religious criterion.”
Is running a wing of a prison a governmental power? Perhaps so.
As long as the officials of the religious organization maintain order in
their wing, keep track of disciplinary infractions, and perform similar
penal functions, the delegation problem plausibly may arise.
But vouchers would eliminate this problem. Neutrality is the key
factor: as the Court held in Kiryas Joel, the problem was that the legis-

174

Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982).
Id. at 126-27 (holding that the statute violated the Establishment Clause).
176
Id. at 127.
177
512 U.S. 687, 690-92 (1994) (discussing the process that culminated in the creation of a special carve-out school district comprising members of the Satmar Hasidic
community).
178
Id. at 690.
175
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lature had “fail[ed] to exercise governmental authority in a religiously
179
neutral way.”
4. The Future of Faith-Based Prisons
For a program to comply with the Establishment Clause, it must
solve the problems discussed above. The religious component must
be watered down. Providers must be chosen neutrally. Secular
programs must be available. Religious programs must not offer significantly greater benefits, and program officials must not maintain order and discipline.
Perhaps one can’t fulfill all these conditions and still have a real
faith-based program. Some programs might be constitutional; for instance, the Federal Bureau of Prisons runs a program called Life
Connections, which “hires spiritual guides of different faiths, links
inmates with mentors of their own faith, and provides no special privi180
leges to participants.”
But if that’s constitutional, it is because it
combines a secular program with extensive extracurricular use of constitutionally innocuous chaplains and volunteers.
But whether or not the current regime could constitutionally support faith-based prisons, vouchers would make faith-based prison pro181
grams much more clearly valid.
B. Beyond the Establishment Clause
A voucher system affects more than just faith-based prisons. Suppose a prison wants to save money or improve security by banning incoming mail or eliminating its grievance system.
Under current law, this would violate prisoners’ constitutional
rights. But what if prisons merely offered these “features” to prisoners,
perhaps as part of a package that might include other benefits like
better health care or gym facilities?

179

Id. at 703.
Patrick B. Cates, Comment, Faith-Based Prisons and the Establishment Clause: The
Constitutionality of Employing Religion as an Engine of Correctional Policy, 41 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 777, 824-25 (2005).
181
Whether they reduce recidivism or not is another question. See generally Volokh,
supra note 48 (reviewing available empirical studies of faith-based prisons and concluding that there’s no strong reason to believe that faith-based prisons work). On whether
faith-based prisons might be affirmatively harmful, see infra text accompanying notes
331-40.
180
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine governs state actors’
ability to “offer” such “deals.” Vouchers would probably allow prisons
to offer such deals to a greater extent than is allowed today. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine serves the purpose, among others,
of making sure that governments don’t abuse their power, and when
prisons compete with each other, the risk of such abuse is reduced.
1. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
It’s one thing to say that there are certain rights the government
may not abridge, but quite another to say that the government may
never induce the waiver of those rights by the offer of benefits. The
government presumably can’t prevent a private school from banning
interracial dating through its disciplinary code, but it may deny such a
182
school a charitable tax exemption.
The federal government might
not be able to force states to adopt a minimum drinking age of twenty183
one, but it may offer federal highway funds to states that do.
Whether the government may conduct a warrantless search of a probationer depends on whether such a search is “reasonable” in a broad
184
sense; a probationer’s consent to such warrantless searches as a condition of his probation, while it may not validate all such searches, at
185
the very least makes them likely to be found reasonable.
These examples all take the form of “deals” or “contracts,” and involve three steps. First, someone holds a constitutional right. Second,
the government controls a benefit which it is under no obligation to
grant. Third, the government offers the benefit conditioned on a
waiver of the right.
The law has neither endorsed such conditions wholesale, nor
banned them entirely. Instead, it has steered a middle course and dis186
tinguished valid conditions from “unconstitutional conditions.”
Consider how this might operate in prisons. Take a right that is
not very valuable to the inmate and that the prison would like the inmate to waive. For instance, the prison might want its sex offender
182

See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604-05 (1983).
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (“Even if Congress might lack
the power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly, we conclude
that encouragement to state action . . . is a valid use of the spending power.”).
184
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
185
See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114, 119-20 (2001).
186
See, e.g., Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (arguing that a state may not impose unconstitutional conditions on foreign corporations transacting business within the state).
183
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inmates to participate in a treatment program. Further suppose the
prison also wants these inmates to take responsibility for past187
uncharged crimes —perhaps because admitting responsibility improves the benefit an inmate receives from the treatment program.
Most sex offenders would probably comply with the condition because
no one will know if they omit undiscovered sex crimes. Even if the
prisoners object to the condition, they likely prefer the proposed ben188
efit more. The Supreme Court held that this deal was valid —but
189
one can think up other deals that are not.
2. Vouchers and the Rationale of Unconstitutional Conditions
Why have such a doctrine? Kathleen Sullivan articulates a systemic rationale: banning certain deals is necessary to preserve, among
other things, “the overall distribution of power between government
190
and rightholders.” Her most interesting argument, for our purposes, is the following:
Preferred constitutional liberties generally declare desirable some realm
of autonomy that should remain free from government encroachment.
Government freedom to redistribute power over presumptively autonomous decisions from the citizenry to itself through the leverage of
191
permissible spending or regulation would jeopardize that realm.

The danger of the government acquiring power over benefit recipients is heightened in prisons. Prisoners’ constitutional rights are
quite minimal. Generally, actual prison conditions fall short of being
unconstituitional. This is good from a prisoner’s perspective, but it
also means that the government can exercise significant leverage over
the inmate.
Prison officials can already make an inmate’s prison experience
much less pleasant with no oversight simply by underinvesting in secu-

187

See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 30-31 (2002) (plurality opinion) (describing a
Kansas prison’s sex offender treatment program which required inmates to sign an
“Admission of Responsibility” form).
188
See id. at 44-45 (allowing a state to require an inmate to choose between participation in a treatment program and losing certain prison privileges, and holding that
such a choice “does not amount to compulsion”).
189
See Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a state
Department of Corrections couldn’t force an inmate to give up accrued interest on
prison savings accounts as a condition of continued prison employment).
190
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1490 (1989).
191
Id.
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rity and health care—thus avoiding the deliberate indifference that
192
constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation —and by removing anything that isn’t part of an inmate’s liberty interest and therefore isn’t
193
subject to the Due Process Clause. Or, at least, they can threaten to
do so—and then offer those benefits back to the inmate in exchange
for a waiver of certain troublesome constitutional rights.
However, in a world with prison vouchers, where prisons compete
and prisoners choose, the risks of abuse are much less. In fact, we
may face a quite different problem: that voucher prisons will become
194
too cushy, undermining the deterrent value of a criminal sentence.
There is always a danger that prisons will improperly pressure inmates
to waive their rights, but this danger is surely attenuated in a competitive context.
Recall, too, that the government is responsible for making sure
that every inmate has a fully constitutionally compliant prison experience, if he wants one. This means not only that every inmate is entitled to secularity on demand, but also that every inmate is entitled to
have a spot in a prison where the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
applies in full force. This is necessary to avoid the unacceptable prospect that all prisons might demand that their inmates waive their
rights. The guarantee of constitutional compliance should further
make us comfortable that deals offered by prisons aren’t illegitimate.
III. VOUCHERS AND PRISON QUALITY
A. The Potential Benefits of Vouchers
Let me recap how vouchers could improve prison quality. Under
a voucher system, inmates would be free to choose a particular prison,
and they would tend to choose prisons that best satisfied their own
preferences. This choice might be very different from the one made
under the current system by prison officials, whose humanity and pro-

192

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976) (“In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”).
193
See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (“As long as the conditions
or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process
Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial
oversight.”).
194
See infra subsection III.B.3.
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195

fessionalism can’t always be taken for granted, and whose interests
196
don’t necessarily align with those of the prisoners.
This choice
might also be different from the one made by judges who may be
197
steering prisoners to particular prisons for political reasons, and
who may actually be opposed to prisoner welfare.
If inmates’ preferences are very heterogeneous, this could just result in a reallocation of inmates among prisons, creating a better
match between prisons and inmates. That alone would be a significant benefit from the prisoners’ point of view, even if some objective
198
measure of “quality” didn’t rise.
But many amenities are likely to be broadly desired: safety, good
medical care, less high-security segregation, better activities and pro199
gramming, and more floor space. Inmates may also value opportu200
nities to work, which may reduce recidivism.
It therefore seems reasonable to expect that prisons, if forced to
compete for prisoners, will offer these broadly desired amenities; I’ve

195

See John J. DiIulio, Jr., What’s Wrong with Private Prisons, PUB. INT., Summer
1988, at 66, 77-78 (describing some prison administrators as “uncaring” and highlighting competent administration as a key attribute of successful prisons).
196
Cf. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 419 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing how state officials overseeing private prisons may focus on minimizing cost
above all other considerations); Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 83-89 (highlighting conflicts of interest between indigent defendants and the current mechanism
for selecting a public defender).
197
Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 111 (arguing that judges steer indigent counsel appointments in part based on political reasons, including courthouse
budgetary constraints and who supported the judge politically).
198
See infra text accompanying note 277; cf. Caroline M. Hoxby, Does Competition
Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1209, 1209
(2000) (“Choice may also allow students to self-sort among schools in a manner that
facilitates learning—for instance, a disabled child may be able to attend a school that
has an especially good program for disabled children.”). But note that from an efficiency perspective, free entry into a marketplace with product diversity can be either
excessive or insufficient. See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND J. ECON. 48, 49, 54-55 (1986) (arguing that heterogeneity may have benefits in a free market).
199
For more on what it means to be a “safer prison,” see infra text accompanying
notes 289-91.
200
Whether prison labor reduces recidivism is empirically disputed. Compare Kathleen E. Maguire et al., Prison Labor and Recidivism, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 3,
15 (1988) (noting that a growing amount of research indicates that programs allowing
inmates to work in prisons have no effect on recidivism rates), with Jeffrey D. Hopper,
The Effects of Private Prison Labor Program Participation on Inmate Recidivism 79-81
(Aug. 2008) (Ph.D. dissertation, Middle Tenn. State Univ.), available at http://
gradworks.umi.com/33/22/3322480.html (finding that prisoner participation in industry work while incarcerated lowers recidivism rates).
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201

suggested a list of them earlier in this Article.
Prisons that have
many of those attributes will likely be oversubscribed, and inmates
may have to go to their second, third, fourth, or even last choice.
Under conditions of substantial overcrowding, perhaps no prison,
not even the worst one, will lose inmates. Thus, in a static world, prisons might not benefit from being more attractive; there would be no
pressure on prisons to change, and so (apart from taste-based reallocation) quality wouldn’t rise. However, in the long run, if the voucher
202
amount is generous enough, prisons will want more inmates, and
oversubscribed prisons will benefit from building extra wings and ex203
tending their business model.
Prisons would thus improve by competing with each other on attributes prisoners value; the mechanism is essentially similar to the one
204
driving educational improvements in voucher schools. Further, individual prisons would reap substantial benefits by adding more valued
features. First, (at least private) prison providers would be able to implement a feature directly, without having to convince a procurement
officer that the feature is a good idea and a wise use of funds. Second,
a prison could benefit more immediately than under the current regime, as it could “poach” existing inmates from other prisons through
transfers rather than having to wait for an influx of new prisoners as
205
Even if an amenity is expensive, a prison can
they are convicted.
206
benefit from adding it if its inmate population increases sufficiently.

201

See supra text accompanying notes 73-103; see also Hoxby, supra note 198, at 1209.
See supra Section I.C; infra Section IV.B.
203
For a discussion of how easy this will be to accomplish, see supra text accompanying notes 150-53.
204
See, e.g., Jay P. Greene et al., School Choice in Milwaukee: A Randomized Experiment
(finding significant effects on math scores starting three years in and significant effects
on reading scores three or four years in for the Milwaukee Choice program), in EVALUATION IN PRACTICE: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 329, 331 (Richard D. Bingham &
Claire L. Felbinger eds., 2d ed. 2002); Jay P. Greene et al., The Effectiveness of School Choice
in Milwaukee: A Secondary Analysis of Data from the Program’s Evaluation 32 tbl.4 (Program
in Educ. Policy & Governance, Occasional Paper 96-3, 1996), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED401597.pdf (finding significant gains in math scores in
students’ third and fourth years in the Milwaukee Choice program, though no significant
effects for reading); Paul E. Peterson et al., An Evaluation of the New York City School Choice
Scholarships Program: The First Year (finding that being offered a voucher had a positive
and significant effect on both math and reading scores, at least in grades four and five, in
the New York City School Choice Scholarships Program), in EARNING AND LEARNING:
HOW SCHOOLS MATTER, at x, x tbl.18 (Susan E. Mayer & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1999).
For a general discussion of these studies, see Volokh, supra note 48.
205
Cf. Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43
REV. ECON. STUD. 217, 230-31 (1976) (arguing that product differentiation may be ex202
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These choice-driven improvements thus bypass the barriers to leg207
islative, administrative, and judicial reform.
Likewise, privatization
may improve quality in a nonchoice allocation regime through com208
petitive bidding and reputation building. But this depends crucially
on the competence and benevolence of the officials who run the bidding (which, like those of the officials who assign prisoners, aren’t
209
guaranteed). Once a private provider gets a prison contract, if reputational and contract-renewal concerns are weak, there are strong in210
centives to reduce quality. Choice prisons, on the other hand, have
less of an incentive to reduce quality because at least the decisionmakers can punish them directly if they observe quality reduc211
tions. If prisoners can transfer out, quality reductions can result in a
loss of inmates. Even if the possibility of transferring is limited, quality
reductions could harm the prison’s reputation, thus reducing the inflow of new prisoners.
Choice can also have long-term effects on the entire prison system. As Caroline Hoxby has noted in the analogous context of school
vouchers: “choice can affect productivity through a variety of longterm, general equilibrium mechanisms that are not immediately avail212
able to an administrator.” In the prison context, this could include
increasing the wages of more competent prison managers or corrections officers, which may attract higher-quality people to these professions. Schools, Hoxby continues, may find it in their interest to “issue
more information about their achievement[s] and may thus gradually
213
make students into better ‘consumers’”; the same could be true for
prisons. The need to attract “customers” may make prisons more responsive to evidence-based techniques rather than fads that appeal to
bureaucrats.
cessive under monopolistic competition because firms fail to take account of the lost
profits of competing firms).
206
See supra Section I.A.
207
See supra text accompanying notes 23-37.
208
See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
209
See supra text accompanying notes 195-97.
210
See Shleifer, supra note 12, at 138-40 (explaining that private prisons might cut
costs and reduce quality to inefficient levels absent “soft incentives”).
211
See id. at 139 (noting that quality reductions often cause consumers to switch
suppliers, and arguing that the lack of these incentives undercuts the value of government-administered programs).
212
Hoxby, supra note 1, at 21; see Caroline M. Hoxby, School Choice and School
Productivity: Could School Choice Be a Tide That Lifts All Boats?, in THE ECONOMICS OF
SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 70, at 287, 309-10.
213
Hoxby, supra note 1, at 21.

VOLOKH REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

Prison Vouchers

2/15/2012 7:15 PM

823

While the “active” inmates under a voucher system are those who
transfer from one prison to another, or make an initial choice to go to
a different prison than the one to which they would otherwise have
214
been assigned, choice could also improve the prison experience for
those who never transfer or who choose to go to their default prison.
In fact, this could be the most important vehicle for improvements if
215
many inmates don’t actively exercise their freedom of choice. Moreover, if public sector quality rises enough, this could overcome any
negative spillovers on certain inmates, such as those based on peer ef216
Similarly, there is evidence that vouchers have improved
fects.
217
productivity in Milwaukee public schools, that charter schools have
improved productivity in Michigan and Arizona public (noncharter)
218
schools, and that the quality of public schools and public school
teachers in Texas is positively correlated with the degree of competi219
tion among public schools, even without vouchers or charter schools.

214

For instance, the most widely publicized results of school vouchers relate to
whether achievement rises for students who actually use the vouchers and transfer to a
voucher-accepting private school. Recent studies suggest that transferring to a private
school does increase scholastic achievement, at least for black students. Paul E. Peterson et al., School Vouchers: Results from Randomized Experiments, in THE ECONOMICS OF
SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 70, at 107, 131.
215
Cf. Hoxby, supra note 1, at 17 (making this point for schools). I have made a
similar point in the context of prison privatization, arguing that cheaper prisons may
alleviate overcrowding and thus improve both the public and private sector. Developments,
supra note 40, at 1875.
216
See infra text accompanying notes 289-91.
217
See Hoxby, supra note 1, at 22-34 (“Overall, Milwaukee suggests that public schools
can have a strong positive productivity response to competition from vouchers.”).
218
See Hoxby, supra note 1, at 44 (finding a causal connection between gains in
productivity and achievement and the introduction of charter schools in Arizona); see also
GREG FORSTER, FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, A WIN-WIN SOLUTION: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON SCHOOL VOUCHERS 24 tbl.4 (2d ed. 2011), available at http://www.edchoice.
org/CMSModules/EdChoice/FileLibrary/656/A-Win-Win-Solution---The-EmpiricalEvidence-on-School-Vouchers.pdf (surveying empirical studies of voucher programs in
Milwaukee, Florida, and elsewhere, and finding positive effects in all but one study).
But see Ladd, supra note 1, at 75 (arguing that there is insufficient evidence to determine the actual impact vouchers have on public schools).
219
Eric A. Hanushek & Steven G. Rivkin, Does Public School Competition Affect Teacher
Quality?, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 70, at 23, 23. Note also
that the likelihood of competitively driven improvements in public sector quality depends on how public sector funding reacts to the use of vouchers or the loss of students generally. See supra text accompanying notes 132-36.
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B. The Potential Disadvantages
Two key factors have been implicit in the argument that vouchers
would improve prisons. The first assumption is that a prisoner’s ability to choose would make certain prisons more attractive, which would
mean that inmates would choose such prisons, and that as a result, the
system as a whole would indeed improve from the prisoner’s perspective. One could dispute this mechanism on a number of grounds.
Perhaps the prison industry won’t be competitive enough to generate
meaningful innovation. Perhaps inmates won’t be informed enough
to reward innovative prisons. Perhaps inmates, while making choices
that are individually rational, will impose external costs on other inmates that leave the system as a whole worse off—for example,
through self-segregation along undesirable dimensions. These sorts
of market failures could prevent vouchers from being successful.
The second assumption is that “improvement” of prisons from the
prisoners’ perspective is socially desirable. This depends on how well
inmates’ preferences are aligned with social preferences. What if
prisoners effectively demand prisons with loose regulation of contraband or with country club–like conditions? While the previous set of
objections stemmed from “market failure,” these objections may be
said to stem from “market success”—in other words, the market
220
“works” too well, and society disapproves.
Another factor has also been implicit—a “step zero” of the analy221
sis: the belief that a regime of choice is, in principle, possible or appropriate for people who have been intentionally deprived of their
choice over most important aspects of their lives.
In this Section, I discuss these three factors. First, I discuss the
nonempirical arguments against vouchers based on the supposed inconsistency between the idea of choice and the idea of incarceration.
Second, I discuss the “market failure” arguments. Third, I discuss the
“market success” arguments.

220

Of course, “market success” is just an evocative term; this is really just another
form of market failure, one that hurts society at large. See supra note 54.
221
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 & n.19 (2006)
(addressing “step zero,” the initial inquiry into whether a framework applies at all, in
one context (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001))).
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1. Nonempirical Arguments Against Vouchers
Is the concept of prison choice inherent in vouchers inconsistent
with the very idea of incarceration? Perhaps prisoners are unable to
222
freely choose because as prisoners, they are under “duress.”
Perhaps the very idea of incarceration is inconsistent with free choice.
Prisoners are placed in an environment that, by its nature, restricts their freedom. They have no privacy rights under the Fourth
223
Amendment. All sex, including consensual sex and sometimes even
masturbation, is forbidden, except in the limited context of conjugal
224
although prisoners and prison officials
visitation programs,
225
acknowledge—even if only tacitly—that these acts do occur. Prisoners aren’t allowed to exercise choice in a range of activities; for in226
stance, they are limited in their right to consent to medical studies.
But the mere fact that prisoners’ choice is sometimes—or even usually—restricted doesn’t mean that prisoners are incapable of exercising choice. Prisoners retain constitutional rights, even if these can be

222

See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 156, at 28 (suggesting that limited circumstances
may affect the constitutional permissibility of a school voucher scheme).
223
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (concluding that a prisoner has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in his prison cell entitling him to Fourth Amendment
protection).
224
See Christopher Hensley, Introduction: Life and Sex in Prison (discussing the policy justifications for and benefits of conjugal visitation programs), in PRISON SEX:
PRACTICE AND POLICY 1, 10 (Christopher Hensley ed., 2002); Brenda V. Smith, Rethinking Prison Sex: Self-Expression and Safety, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 185, 200 & nn.79-80
(2006) (discussing prison regulations regarding a variety of sexual acts); see also Dolovich, supra note 74, at 59 n.296 (explaining the difficulties inherent in collecting data
about sexual contact between inmates and staff at a particular prison).
225
See Dolovich, supra note 74, at 40 & n.196 (explaining that one attraction of the
L.A. County gay segregation program is that inmates admitted there “will find many
willing sexual partners”); id. at 88 n.393 (noting the existence of prison condomdistribution programs); Nina T. Harawa et al., Sex and Condom Use in a Large Unit for
Men Who Have Sex with Men (MSM) and Male-to-Female Transgenders, 21 J. HEALTHCARE
FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 1071, 1076 (2010) (discussing condom use among a random sample of inmates in a Los Angeles prison). See generally Terry A. Kupers, Rape
and the Prison Code (discussing systemic and sociological factors that feed the culture of
rape that pervades most prisons in spite of bans on sexual activity), in PRISON MASCULINITIES 111 (Don Sabo et al. eds., 2001).
226
See Ian Urbina, Panel Suggests Using Inmates in Drug Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2006, at 1 (discussing current and historical issues involved in the participation of inmates in medical studies). See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS (Lawrence O. Gostin et al. eds.,
2007) (providing a comprehensive review of the ethical considerations implicated in
conducting research on prisoners).
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227

limited in the interests of prison management.
Many of these
228
229
rights—for instance, free speech, free exercise of religion, and
230
freedom to marry —are based on the idea that, despite their unfree
condition, prisoners can still make autonomous moral choices. In
231
fact, prisoners’ ability to experience religious freedom, combined
with outrage at prison officials’ arbitrary treatment of various merito232
rious religious claims, motivated the passage of the bipartisan Reli233
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, so that
now, “in principle, inmate religious claims against states are given
more solicitous consideration than are nonprisoner religious claims
234
(Presumably, the Prison Rape Elimination Act of
against states.”
235
236
2003, which passed unanimously, also bespeaks at least a minimal
237
commitment to bodily and sexual autonomy. )
Prisoners often have some flexibility as to whether they work while
238
in prison.
They’re allowed to control the course of their own litiga-

227

See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (adopting a more lenient standard
of review for cases in which prisoners’ constitutional rights were impinged in the name
of legitimate penological interests).
228
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (“[A] prison inmate retains those
First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner . . . .”).
229
See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (declaring that inmates are entitled
to “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing [their] faith comparable to the opportunity
afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts”).
230
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 96-99 (overturning a regulation banning inmate marriages without approval of the prison superintendent).
231
See Lynn S. Branham, “The Devil Is in the Details”: A Continued Dissection of the
Constitutionality of Faith-Based Prison Units, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 409, 427-29 (2008) (noting that most prisons have chapels and other spaces set aside for religious practice).
232
See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716 & n.5 (2005) (detailing Congress’s findings regarding “frivolous or arbitrary” barriers to prisoners’ free exercise of
religious beliefs).
233
Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5).
The “institutionalized persons” section of the Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
234
Developments, supra note 40, at 1895 (emphasis omitted).
235
Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609).
236
Robert Weisberg & David Mills, Violence Silence: Why No One Really Cares About
Prison Rape, SLATE (Oct. 1, 2003, 2:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/jurisprudence/2003/10/violence_silence.html.
237
But see id. (arguing that “no one who knows our criminal justice system believes
[the Act] will do much of anything to eliminate prison rape”).
238
See Christopher Stafford, Note, Finding Work: How to Approach the Intersection of
Prisoner Reentry, Employment, and Recidivism, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 261, 272
(2006) (noting the low rate of participation among those eligible for work assignments
in prison). Federal prisoners, however, are required to work if they’re physically able,
not a security risk, not subject to discipline, and not participating in particular rehabilitative programs. Crime Control Act of 1990 § 2905, 18 U.S.C. § 4121 (2006). The
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tion. Moreover, they can choose whether to participate in prison pro239
240
grams and whether to accept offers of protective custody.
Suppose that a prisoner values prison and its coercive nature.
Perhaps the prisoner’s behavior on the outside has been so selfdestructive and his impulses so uncontrollable that he experiences
prison as a respite from everyday concerns and the overwhelming
241
choices of freedom.
Even such a prisoner may well want to make
some choices. Aside from the opportunity to use prison to experience
242
religious and spiritual renewal, anyone may value being in a place
with relatively better medical care or lower assault or rape rates.
There are various reasons for restricting prisoners’ freedom, including retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence. One also may
want to protect prisoners from other prisoners; rapists may be able to
243
intimidate their victims into stating that the sex was consensual or
perhaps the prison system’s interest in preventing the spread of STDs
244
might override inmates’ interest in sexual freedom. One may want
to protect prisoners from hidden and subtle coercion from other
sources. Given a history of inmate mistreatment by medical research-

same is true in various states. E.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 497.099 (West 2004); see
also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy: Resources in Administrative Law
(“[I]n 1997, ten states created mandatory work programs for inmates.”), in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 261, 275 ( Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep:
What Prevents the Application of the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 395, 409 (2009) (examining nonpunitive compulsory labor in prisons within the
context of the Thirteenth Amendment).
239
See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 44-45 (2002) (plurality opinion) (allowing a
state to require an inmate to choose between participation in a treatment program and
losing certain prison privileges and holding that such a choice “does not amount to
compulsion”).
240
Harding v. Jones, 768 F. Supp. 275, 277-78 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (maintaining that a
prisoner’s decision to participate in protective custody is entirely discretionary).
241
See MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS: THE
UNCONSCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 21-23, 26-27, 30-31, 48-50 (1996)
(exploring the nearly maternal comfort some inmates derive from incarceration).
242
See, e.g., Duffy v. State Pers. Bd., 283 Cal. Rptr. 622, 629 (Ct. App. 1991) (affirming
that religion in prison “subserves the rehabilitative function by providing an area within
which the inmate may reclaim his dignity and reassert his individuality”); DUNCAN, supra
note 241, at 32-37 (considering the prison as a context for “spiritual rebirth”).
243
See Smith, supra note 224, at 218-22 (“Often, concern for physical safety and
well-being is a key motivator for sex between inmates and between inmates and correctional staff.”); cf. id. at 193-95 (outlining the effects that unduly strict regulations on
sexual activity in prisons may have on the environment of consensual prison sex).
244
See id. at 229 (discussing public health risks, including hepatitis and HIV infection, associated with sex in prisons).
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ers, it’s certainly not crazy to want to exercise a bit of paternalism on
245
behalf of relatively powerless prisoners. But all this is consistent with
a recognition that, in whatever free space is left to them, prisoners are
able to make choices that are as autonomous as anyone else’s.
One may still argue that, though prisoners of course retain resid246
ual liberty, there’s no value in such liberty, and so there’s no reason
to treat prisoners like parents of schoolchildren, whose choices we
presumptively value.
But nothing in this proposal requires treating prisoners as morally
entitled to choose. In fact, the same is true of school choice. Some advocates of school choice present vouchers as designed to give parents
247
the choice they are entitled to, but others present vouchers as merely an instrumental way of using choice to pursue socially beneficial
248
Indeed, this is the standard approach of economists, who
policies.
usually treat competition and choice as mechanisms that can improve
249
250
social welfare, and not as morally valuable goals in themselves.
Similarly, we can allow prisoner choice instrumentally, as a policy
matter, if we find that the social positives outweigh the social negatives—in other words, using prisoner choice as a means to the end of

245

See Urbina, supra note 226, at 1 (reporting on a federal panel that recommended using inmates in drug trials).
246
Cf. Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions: Reflections on the
Future of Shaming Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1401 (2007)
(calling an emphasis on prisoner choice “largely beside the point” because punishment is “a coercive measure imposed on offenders as a means of demonstrating their
lack of superiority to the state”).
247
See CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note 118, at
4 (detailing arguments for the proposition that school choice is a “fundamental
right”); see also AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 28-33 (1999) (discussing, and
rejecting, the ideal of the “state of families,” which contends that families have an inherent right to control their children’s upbringing).
248
CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note 118, at 5
(“Saul Yanofsky, superintendent of White Plains, New York, Public Schools, concludes
that ‘choice is a means to a variety of ends; it is not the end.’”); GUTMANN, supra note
247, at 66-70 (discussing consequentialist justifications for voucher plans).
249
See generally ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 549-50
(1995) (presenting the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, which “provides a formal and very general confirmation of Adam Smith’s asserted ‘invisible hand’
property of the market,” showing that competitive equilibria, under certain assumptions, are Pareto optimal).
250
Cf., e.g., LUDWIG VON MISES, LIBERALISM: THE CLASSICAL TRADITION 4 (Bettina
Bien Greaves ed., Ralph Raico trans., Liberty Fund 2005) (1927) (“[T]here is only one
argument [against slavery] that can and did refute all others—namely that free labor is
incomparably more productive than slave labor.”).
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socially desirable correctional policy—even if we don’t actually respect
251
prisoner choice.
2. “Market Failure” Arguments Against Vouchers
If we suppose that there’s nothing about a voucher proposal that’s
inherently inconsistent with the idea of incarceration, we may then
proceed to the next question: whether prison vouchers would work.
The discussion above of how prisons would accommodate prison252
ers’ values if the prisons had to compete for prisoners assumes that
market forces would lead prisons to offer more valued amenities.
Here, I discuss possible market failures that could prevent this from
happening.
a. Barriers to Individually Maximizing Decisionmaking
Information. Convicted defendants may not know the actual quality of prisons, just as parents may not know the actual quality of
253
schools. Does this argument apply with more or less force in prisons
than in schools?
251

There is a robust tradition of opposition to private prisons on “social meaning”
and other nonempirical grounds, recently embodied by, for instance, Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149,
152 (2010). See also HCJ 2605/05 Acad. Ctr. of Law & Bus., Human Rights Div. v. Minister of Fin. ¶¶ 18, 33 [2009] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/
05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.htm (holding that prison privatization violates “the
constitutional rights to personal liberty and human dignity of inmates” because of private prisons’ profitmaking aspect, even if the level of human rights violations in each
prison “is identical”); DiIulio, supra note 195, at 71 (“The question of whether it is ever
right to profit from the misfortunes of criminals and their victims is a serious one.”);
Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-to-Be-Met Challenges for
Law and Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749, 769 (2011) (arguing that certain tasks like
imprisonment must be public not because public officials are superior, but because the
identity of the agent who performs these tasks has an intrinsic value); Michael Walzer,
At McPrison and Burglar King, It’s . . . Hold the Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 1985, at 10
(arguing that prison privatization is illegitimate because it forces prisoners to interact
with private parties with a corporate purpose). I respond to these critiques in other
work. Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor Distinction (October 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). But nothing
in these critiques seems directly on point to the prison voucher idea, especially since
choice is conceptually distinct from privatization. See supra Section I.B.
252
See supra Section III.A.
253
SMITH & MEIER, supra note 15, at 126-27 (“The market solution assumes parents
and students will have enough information to make a decision on what school offers
the ‘best’ education. This assumption appears to be patently insupportable.” (citing
Brown, supra note 127, at 293)); Brown, supra note 127, at 292 (“Elementary and secondary schooling are excellent examples of input-based relationships between agents
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Someone sentenced to prison for the first time may not know
much about different prisons. Even repeat offenders might have little
direct experience with prisons if they’ve mostly spent time in jails rather than prisons; even someone who’s been in one prison may know
nothing about others.
But information is available about prisons from several sources.
First, information can spread by word of mouth from friends or
neighbors who have been in prison. Second, prisons can advertise,
and (possibly anonymous) reviews of prisons by current or former in254
mates may be available on the Internet.
Third, there are already
ways to evaluate prisons, such as reports from monitoring agencies or
255
the Logan quality of confinement index. Prisons could even be required to publish such information as part of their advertising, as well
as other information that would result from the voucher program
such as the length of the wait list and the rate of transfer out of the
256
prison. The Federal Prison Guidebook already describes facility charac257
teristics in detail for the benefit of criminal defense lawyers. Another possible model would be the federal government’s “Nursing Home

(schools) and their clients (students, parents and taxpayers). Furthermore, the relationships are based on an inherent uncertainty in the production process that places
the task of monitoring output somewhere between expensive and impossible.”).
Richard F. Elmore observes,
In education and medical care there are at least two a priori reasons for skepticism about informed choice. One reason is that the practice of education and
medicine, and the organization of that practice, are relatively complex . . . . A
second reason . . . is that providers . . . have relatively strong incentives to limit
clients’ access to information.
Richard F. Elmore, Choice as an Instrument of Public Policy: Evidence from Education and
Health Care, in 1 CHOICE AND CONTROL IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE THEORY OF
CHOICE AND CONTROL IN EDUCATION 285, 299 (William H. Clune & John F. Witte eds.,
1990) (citation omitted).
254
Cf. Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 415-17 (2009)
(describing how feedback conveyed through the Internet can help consumers pick the
highest-quality product).
255
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
256
Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 102 (suggesting similar publication
requirements for criminal defense attorneys’ qualifications and experience).
257
ALAN ELLIS & J. MICHAEL HENDERSON, FEDERAL PRISON GUIDEBOOK (2010–
2011 ed. 2010). The publisher’s web site describing the Guidebook offers the subtitle:
“Federal prison placement, profiles, and tips: How to ensure that your client gets into
the best possible prison and is released at the earliest opportunity.” Federal Prison
Guidebook, JAMESPUBLISHING, http://jamespublishing.com/books/fpg.htm (last visited
Dec. 15, 2011).
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258

Compare” site,
which conveniently pulls together governmentcollected information about nursing homes.
Fourth, if the voucher program allows an inmate to transfer out
after a certain amount of time, that inmate will at least have some direct experience of his or her own prison. If that experience is bad
259
enough, it could be worthwhile to gamble on another prison.
So far, the arguments here look similar to those for schools. But
the informational problem seems to be less severe in the prison context because the people who choose the prison are the same people who
260
experience the service. With schools, by contrast, there is an agency
problem: the parents make the choice, but because they don’t experience the school directly, they have less of an incentive to become
well informed and are less able to do so. Parents are imperfect agents
261
of their children, whereas inmates are perfect agents of themselves.
A convicted defendant may also have some help from his lawyer,
just as lawyers now try to get their clients’ sentences reduced by enrolling them in drug treatment programs or enlisting them in the mili262
tary. The government could also provide a default assignment or a
258

Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare
(last visited Dec. 15, 2011).
259
See supra text accompanying note 110.
260
Morley, supra note 127, at 1797-1800 (cataloguing barriers to parents’ ability to
monitor the quality of their child’s school).
261
See Brown, supra note 127, at 294 (highlighting that parents, not students, are
the “ultimate consumer” because they pay for schooling); see also Burton A. Weisbrod
& Mark Schlesinger, Public, Private, Nonprofit Ownership and the Response to Asymmetric
Information: The Case of Nursing Homes (noting similar agency problem with respect to
nursing homes), in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 133, 138-39 (Susan
Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986); cf. Sigler, supra note 251, at 160 (pointing out the agency
problems under the current model of assigned prisons, where inmates “are not the
purchasers of prison services”). I take no position here on who—parents or children—
should choose if vouchers are used for juvenile detention facilities. Of course, parents
may also choose differently than their children would because they value different
things, perhaps for good reason. In this sense, an “agency problem” in school selection may be positive. And one can argue the same for prison—the absence of an
agency problem isn’t all good, since prisoners will have some preferences that are socially undesirable. On this, see supra text accompanying notes 243-44.
262
Natasha Saulnier, Recruiting at Any Cost: How the Pentagon Keeps the New Recruits
Coming, COMMONDREAMS.ORG (Dec. 10, 2004), http://www.commondreams.org/
views04/1210-20.htm (“In the Vietnam era, Judges often offered enlistment as an alternative to prosecution and jail time. But after Vietnam, Congress passed legislation
to prevent this practice. But former recruiters and military lawyers affirm that it is still
taking place in a more covert form, with judges often working in concert with recruiters to drop charges.”). But see 3 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-8.010 (2d ed.
2010–2011) (“Plea or sentence bargaining agreements should not be contingent on, or
contain provisions designed to facilitate, enlistment in the Armed Services.”).
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263

list of recommendations, although the bureaucrats who currently
make inmate assignments may well be less favorably disposed toward
prisoners than education bureaucrats are toward schoolchildren.
Ultimately, what convicted defendants lack in information, they
may make up for in motivation, both to acquire information and to
264
act on it. Even if these information problems persist, this argument
favors having prisons run by the nonprofit sector, just as information
problems in education are often taken as an argument supporting
265
nonprofit schools.
Competitiveness. In addition to this lack of information, there
might also be insufficient competitiveness, meaning that inmate
266
choice might still fail to meet inmate desires.
Although I’ve stressed that prison choice needn’t involve private
267
provision, making the market competitive enough to respond to
“consumer demand” might require the participation of private prisons. Public prisons, after all, may not even want more prisoners. To268
They
day, corrections departments actually ask for fewer prisoners.
may do this because of inadequate funding, which would be alleviated
if an adequate voucher accompanied each prisoner. This solution
would require total voucher funding to do more than merely match
the current funding for the correctional system. Or perhaps they’re
just advocating a less incarcerative penal policy in general and not taking a position on whether they, as opposed to someone else, should

263

Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 103 (describing how courts could
create a list or registry of criminal defense attorneys to assist defendants in making
more informed choices).
264
Cf. id. at 86, 107 (arguing that, though criminal defendants have trouble determining who the best lawyer is, he “might be better off making his own, poorly informed, choice” than relying on the choice of a defender or judge who is better informed but doesn’t have the defendant’s interests at heart); Trebilcock & Iacobucci,
supra note 124, at 1448 (describing how consumer choice disciplines private actors into
disclosing useful information).
265
See supra sources cited in note 127.
266
Elmore, supra note 253, at 308-09 (discussing the Dutch system of school
choice, which some argue “does not operate as a quasi-competitive market offering
options to its clients, but rather as a cartel of interlocking interests supported by the
state which limits competition and improvements in quality”).
267
See supra Section I.B.
268
See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy,
60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1235-37 (2008) (describing several examples of state correctional officers who have requested reductions in the prison population, including by
suggesting alternate sentencing schemes).
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269

get existing prisoners.
But in general, it’s not obvious that public
270
prisons benefit from having more prisoners, and in any event, public prisons may have less flexibility than private prisons to respond to
market incentives. To combat this problem, rewards and penalties for
public prisons should be structured so that it’s in their best interest to
attract more people and so that they have the freedom to experiment
with different models.
One shouldn’t overstate the difference between the public and
private sectors: private and public school curricula often look quite
similar, perhaps because adopting similar curricula allows parents to
minimize the risk that their children will be unprepared to compete
271
against their peers in college admissions and in the job market.
This may apply to prisons too: prisons are traumatic places even in
the best circumstances, and inmates who will spend a few years in one
may not want to experiment.
But this doesn’t mean that competition is useless or that schools
(or prisons) won’t differ in their treatment of students (or inmates).
First, some schools (or prisons) will cater to those parents (or inmates)
272
whose uncertainty or risk tolerance differs from the norm. Similarly, inmates may have heterogeneous rates of substitution between, for
example, the risk of violence and the quality of medical care. Second,
schools still vary in “location, presence of religious instruction, and,
perhaps most importantly, whether a school is a ‘good’ school or a
273
‘bad’ one in terms of technical efficiency.” All these factors are relevant for inmates as well. The third factor—the actual productivity of
the prison—may most significantly drive prison improvements.

269

Cf. id. at 1220-21, 1227-30 (distinguishing between pro-incarceration advocacy,
which seeks to increase man-days in prison, and pro-privatization advocacy, which seeks
to acquire a greater proportion of the existing man-days).
270
Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 104 (explaining that public defenders may be motivated to perform poorly in order to reduce their caseload).
Compare WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
36-42 (1971) (arguing that bureaucrats are largely motivated by a desire to maximize
their budgets), with Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law,
118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 932-34 (2005) (questioning the Niskanen hypothesis by proposing alternate motivations for bureaucrats, such as matching the budget of their agency
with the minimum cost of operations).
271
See Brown, supra note 127, at 287-88.
272
See id. at 297 n.1 (arguing that art and science magnet schools exist in large cities because “the desire to specialize is a rare trait, which can be accommodated only
under the most unusual circumstances of large scale systems”).
273
Id. at 291.
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b. External Effects of Individually Rational Decisionmaking
The previous market failure arguments focused on the plight of
the individual inmate-consumer who wouldn’t know how to choose or
who would be faced with unresponsive suppliers. Other market failure arguments could be based on externalities. Even if inmates
choose rationally for themselves, the results may be suboptimal be274
cause individual decisions negatively affect other prisoners.
The administrative burden on the system poses one obvious ex275
ternality (in this instance on the taxpayer).
I only flag this briefly,
because the administrative costs of running the system seem minor
relative to the overall advantages or disadvantages of the system itself.
Another effect of prison choice could be distributional across inmates. The better informed inmates will tend to get better prisons,
and this population is likely made up of repeat prisoners and those
276
with the best connections in the criminal world.
This objection is
strongest when there’s a single, unidimensional measure of prison
quality. If “best” is different for different prisoners—if some prisoners
prefer proximity to family while others prefer good medical care and
still others prefer particular job training programs—choice serves a
277
valuable matching purpose. In the extreme case, everyone could have
his or her top choice. Moreover, even if there’s some redistribution
from less- to more-informed prisoners, a rising tide could lift all boats:
if prison vouchers lead to quality improvements, the uninformed may
become better off as well—much like school choice can improve pub278
lic schools even for students who don’t use vouchers.

274

Of course, there are also external effects on third parties outside of the prison
system. I defer that discussion to the next section on “market success” problems. See
infra subsection III.B.3.
275
Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 111 (noting that the administrative
burden on the courts may motivate judicial decisions regarding freedom of choice).
276
Cf. United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1979) (acknowledging
the risk that letting defendants choose their own counsel may disproportionately benefit
repeat offenders); Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 110 (arguing that freedom
of choice for appointed counsel may disproportionately benefit “well-informed defendants,” which in turn “may include a disproportionate share of repeat offenders”). For
an example of the distributive argument against choice in the educational context, see
CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note 118, at 25-27.
277
Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 109 (noting that freedom to choose
appointed counsel could better match attorneys based on defendants’ idiosyncratic
preferences).
278
See supra text accompanying notes 215-19; see also H. Spencer Banzhaf & Garima
Bhalla, Do Households Prefer Small School Districts? A Natural Experiment 9-10
(Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/=1247822
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Similarly, some have argued that, to the extent that the weakest
and most vulnerable inmates “escape” into safer environments, the
burden of rape and violence falls onto the next weakest remaining
279
This is a plausible
inmates. The result is a redistribution of rape.
concern, although rape and violence tend to become a costlier enterprise for the predator when the remaining potential victims are, on
280
average, less obvious targets and are better able to put up a fight.
Overall the redistribution would probably also reduce the extent of
281
the problem.
The rest of this subsection focuses on a particular dynamic that
seems especially relevant in the prison context: self-segregation of
prisoners based on their level of violence, gang membership, or race.
In schools, the quality of one’s fellow students helps determine
the quality of one’s education. Thus, students (or usually their parents) seek out schools with “better” students, which tends to cause
282
pressure to stratify.
Of course, the empirical importance of these
283
pressures depends on the design of the particular voucher program.
If such stratification occurs in schools, it can have a variety of effects. First, the mere existence of segregation is significant—as when
students seek out other students of their own social class, ethnicity, religion, or race. However, voluntary segregation, even if some consider it
undesirable in itself, doesn’t necessarily affect educational outcomes.
Second, because of the peer effects discussed above, stratification
can affect the overall quality of the system. In schools, this is so even if
(suggesting that educational choice might not only improve educational quality
through competition but also serve an independently valuable function in allowing
consumers to sort themselves).
279
See Jeannie Suk, Redistributing Rape, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 111-13 (2011)
(presenting this point as a critique of Sharon Dolovich’s advocacy of programs like the
Los Angeles County gay segregation unit, or even of broader-based units that segregate
vulnerable inmates generally); see also Dolovich, supra note 74, at 80-82 (responding to
Suk’s concerns about weaker men becoming targets for rape). Dolovich and Suk argue
in the context of assigned jails, but similar arguments could be made about vouchers.
280
Dolovich, supra note 74, at 82.
281
However, I later discuss how a reallocation of prisoners can lead to increased
violence. For instance, incomplete segregation by violence level, race, or gang affiliation may disrupt an existing balance of power in a prison and leaves minority gang
members at the mercy of the majority gang. See infra text accompanying notes 293-307.
282
See Helen F. Ladd, School Vouchers: A Critical View, J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn
2002, at 3, 13-14 (arguing that the “peer effect” of parents choosing schools based on
social and ethnic composition, coupled with peer pressure from other parents, will
lead to racial and socioeconomic stratification between schools).
283
See Hoxby, supra note 1, at 54-56 (comparing achievement outcomes across
schools using different types of voucher programs).
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parents don’t select directly based on the school’s test scores, so long
as they choose based on something correlated with high achievement
284
like socioeconomic status.
Whether this applies to prisons depends on the significance of
stratification pressures and peer effects. As an initial matter, the pre285
dicted stratification effect for schools arises—if at all —not only because of peer effects but also because of tuition. Rich people can afford to pay more for their children to receive a better education.
Personal achievement increases when a student is surrounded by smarter peers. Thus, private schools can benefit by attracting high-ability
students with low tuitions and then charging high tuitions to rich stu286
dents who want to benefit from the resulting positive peer effect.
Since prisons won’t charge fees, they can’t utilize a tuition-based
stratification mechanism. If prisons can’t be selective in their “admis287
sions,” stratification will only be based on differences in taste. If
everyone had identical preferences for prisons, then everyone would
rank prisons equally, and a random cross section of inmates would

284

See Hoxby, supra note 198, at 1214-16 (examining the factors parents consider
when making choices in the education market).
285
Whether school vouchers would actually increase stratification is disputed,
since public schools are already stratified because of patterns of residential segregation. See MERRIFIELD, supra note 128, at 6 (disputing, based on existing “de facto segregation” in public schools, claims that vouchers would increase stratification); Caroline Minter Hoxby, Are Efficiency and Equity in School Finance Substitutes or Complements?, J.
ECON. PERSP., Fall 1996, at 51, 69 (noting the prevalence of “homogenous school districts” and of students with high human capital at certain schools); cf. Dennis Epple &
Richard Romano, Neighborhood Schools, Choice, and the Distribution of Education Benefits
(stratification engendered by neighborhood schooling without intradistrict choice is
comparable to stratification engendered by “a universal and laissez-faire voucher system with vouchers of sufficient magnitude”), in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE,
supra note 70, at 227, 234-35 [hereinafter Epple & Romano, Neighborhood Schools]; id. at
272 (“Even a cursory look at the stratification of households across neighborhood
schools in large urban districts is sufficient to put to rest the notion that there is no
stratification among schools in a district when expenditures are equalized.”); Dennis
Epple & Richard Romano, Educational Vouchers and Cream Skimming, 49 INT’L ECON.
REV. 1395, 1426-27 (2008) (claiming that different voucher designs can have radically
different stratification effects and that vouchers that place no restrictions on tuition or
admissions will result in “cream skimming that adversely affects poor and less able students,” while other decisions might minimize stratification); Hoxby, supra note 198, at
1210 (observing that reforms extend, rather than introduce, choice, and that the stratification effects likely materialize more slowly and more incrementally than anticipated).
286
E.g., Dennis Epple & Richard E. Romano, Competition Between Private and Public
Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 33, 43-47 (1998) (suggesting
that high-income students will subsidize high-ability students when vouchers are available); Epple & Romano, Neighborhood Schools, supra note 285, at 235.
287
See supra Section I.C.
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end up in the best prisons. If stratification occurs, it will be because
prisons differ in what they offer and prisoners differ in what they val288
Prisons with effective violence-prevention policies will acquire
ue.
the prisoners who place the highest relative value on low violence
(bearing in mind that prisoners can still only select within their security classification); prisons with good medical care will acquire the prisoners who put the highest relative value on such care.
Would self-segregation of the prison system by violence level—into
“safer” and “more violent” prisons—be beneficial?
First, let’s flesh out what it means to talk about safer prisons. Relatively nonviolent prisoners would prefer a prison with low violence
289
rates—but so would violent predators.
As a result, a prisoner who
values safety should select a prison that has policies that encourage lower violence and should avoid prisons that merely happen to be less violent, for example, because of their inmate composition. Such policies
may include continuous monitoring of admitted inmates to weed out
290
the fakers —although the effectiveness of such a scheme isn’t guaran291
teed.
Prisoners may not be able to tell from the outside whether a
low violence level at a particular prison is due to good policies or good
prisoners, but advertising, testimonials, and experience might effectively inform them. A prison with effective security policies would thus
tend to attract nonviolent prisoners and deter predators, who would
prefer to stay in prisons with comparatively ineffective policies.
What would such stratification do to the overall “quality” of the
inmates? Caroline Hoxby writes, in the context of human capital seg288

Cf. MERRIFIELD, supra note 128, at 12 (discussing, in the school voucher context, the preferences for subject- or pedagogy-focused schools and the multidimensional abilities of students).
289
See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 74, at 21-22 (noting that the lack of procedural
controls under an early Los Angeles County gay segregation program meant that “all a
would-be predator needed to do to gain access to potential victims was to aver his homosexuality on entrance to the Jail”).
290
See id. at 23 (reserving the power under a later iteration of the gay segregation
program for “[ j]ail officials to determine whether those men who claimed to be gay
belonged in the unit reserved exclusively for ‘homosexual inmates’”); id. at 32, 43 (observing that it is less important to be perfectly accurate in classifying gay inmates than
it is to demonstrate an “official commitment” to “accurate classification” and “persistent monitoring”).
291
See id. at 32 (noting that even if nongays could be excluded from the gay segregation program, “heterosexuals and bisexuals have no monopoly on sexual predation”). But see id. at 33 (reporting that the gay segregation unit is “well-known to be the
safest place in the Jail,” which means that “many of those seeking admission under
false pretenses only want a respite from the gang politics and consequent pressure and
volatility that define daily life in [the general population]”).

VOLOKH REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

838

2/15/2012 7:15 PM

[Vol.160: 779

regation (the tendency of high-quality students to live near and attend
school with other high-quality students):
[W]ithout knowing how spillovers work, we do not know whether the equilibrium has too much or too little segregation. Consider the “one bad apple”
scenario. If a single household with low human capital in the district could
make everyone else learn substantially less, yet would only experience small
human capital gains itself, there would obviously be too little segregation.
The converse scenario might be called “one shining light.” If a single household with high human capital could make everyone else learn substantially
more, yet its own children would not learn any less (despite being surrounded
by children from deprived backgrounds), there would obviously be too much
292
segregation.

Prisons seem more like the “one bad apple” scenario. Highviolence inmates exert a bad influence on low-violence prisoners
and—now switching metaphors—“the bad eggs seem to have more of
293
an influence on the good eggs than vice versa.” Stratification by violence level may then be desirable to mitigate this problem.
However, this solution may not hold true if stratification is incomplete. Imperfect stratification might be extremely bad for some lowviolence inmates who are denied their preferred choice of prison and
remain among an increased population of high-violence inmates. So,
violence-based self-segregation may be beneficial in the extreme case,
but it could be either beneficial or harmful in the imperfect cases.
What if inmates self-segregate according to race and ethnicity?
This resembles self-segregation according to gang membership, be294
cause race substantially drives prison violence and prison gangs typi295
cally organize along ethnic and racial lines.
296
Estimates of prison gang membership vary widely. Some sources
report that prison gangs account for no more than 5% or 6% of pris-

292

Hoxby, supra note 285, at 63.
Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1055.
294
THE COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, supra note 18, at 23
(linking race to violence in prisons but suggesting that good prison leaders can adopt
policies that mitigate race-related violence); id. at 26 (contrasting Sheriff Lee Baca’s
view attributing the 2006 Los Angeles jail riots to racial tensions, with Jody Kent’s view
that “interracial violence was in large part a reaction to institutional problems, particularly crowding, which had created stressful living conditions and a near total absence
of programming and productive activities”).
295
See Dolovich, supra note 74, at 49-50 (defining “gangs” as interchangeable with
“race” in California prisons); Chad R. Trulson et al., Gang Suppression and Institutional
Control, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 2006, at 26, 26-27 (noting that race and ethnicity
represent two of the primary determinants of inmate behavior and gang membership).
296
Some prison systems manipulate their gang density by counting only “validated
gang members.” See KNOX, supra note 21, at 435. Additionally, many researchers fail to
293
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297

on inmates. Others estimate that mean gang density at male institutions rose from 9.4% in 1991 to 24.7% in 1999, and 3.5% to 7.5% at
298
female institutions. The 24.7% figure at male institutions masks var299
iation by security level: in male institutions membership was 16.1%
in minimum-security prisons, 23.6% in medium-security prisons, and
300
And even these numbers do
32.7% in maximum-security prisons.
not account for substantial regional variation (states have reported
301
numbers as divergent as 75% in California prisons and 90% in Illi302
303
nois ) and variation among individual prisons (some have reported
304
a gang density of zero and others 100% membership ), although
such stark divergence may also reflect differences in reporting stand-

recognize the difference in reporting mechanisms. See id. The error leads them to
“grossly underestimate the scope and extent of the prison gang problem to the point
of officially disseminating totally inaccurate information in their government funded
research reports.” Id.
297
E.g., AM. CORR. ASS’N, GANGS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 8 tbl.1 (1993) (estimating total gang membership to be 5.9% in 1992); Trulson et al., supra note 295, at 26 (“[S]trictly prison-based gang members accounted for
1.2 percent of all state and federal prison inmates . . . . Gang-related inmates constituted less than 5 percent of all prison inmates across the country.”); cf. KNOX, supra note
21, at 434 (calling the 1993 American Correctional Association report “notoriously unreliable and more fictional than factual”). Knox noted that other researchers found
gang membership rates in 1993 to be double the ACA’s estimate. Id. at 446.
298
KNOX, supra note 21, at 448; see also Knox, supra note 107, at 8 (reporting that
prison wardens surveyed estimated 25.9% gang density among new arriving male inmates and 6.28% among female inmates). Gang allegiances shift over the course of incarceration, with inmates joining or quitting gangs. The Knox survey reported an adjusted gang density of 24.8% for male institutions and 4.09% for female institutions. Id.
299
George W. Knox & Edward D. Tromanhauser, Gangs and Their Control in Adult
Correctional Institutions, PRISON J., Fall–Winter 1991, at 15, 19 (providing empirical
support for the intuition that “the higher the security level, the higher the density of
gang members”).
300
KNOX, supra note 21, at 449.
301
Id. at 434.
302
Knox & Tromanhauser, supra note 299, at 20 (citing Michael P. Lane, Inmate
Gangs, CORRECTIONS TODAY, July 1989, at 98). Even the 1993 American Correctional
Association report, which has been criticized as severely underestimating gang membership, reports 48.1% gang membership in Illinois in 1992, an order of magnitude
higher than in any other state. AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 297, at 8 tbl.1.
303
Cf. REID H. MONTGOMERY & GORDON A. CREWS, A HISTORY OF CORRECTIONAL
VIOLENCE: AN EXAMINATION OF REPORTED CAUSES OF RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES 25
(1998) (noting that 80% to 90% of inmates “in many prison systems have some affiliation with street gangs” but also that affiliation differs from membership and that street
gangs aren’t the same as prison gangs (citing GANGS: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPROACH
( J. Mitchell Miller & Jeffery P. Rush eds., 1996))).
304
KNOX supra note 21, at 448.
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ards. Estimates of gangs’ contribution to prison violence also vary
305
306
greatly, from less than 30% to over 50%.
The prevalence of prison gangs—even if the low estimates are
right, there are some systems with high gang density—suggests that racial/ethnic or gang-based segregation is a realistic possibility. It’s
plausible that an inmate will seek out other inmates of the same race
or ethnicity, if only to be victimized less by opposing gangs.
This would tend to make voluntary self-segregation, either by race
or gang affiliation, a positive force purely from the perspective of
307
prison security.
However, imperfect segregation could be bad for
inmates of the minority racial or ethnic group or of the minority gang
who don’t get their first-choice prisons.
At least one study has found that racial integration may not actually increase prison violence. In Texas, where the prison system has
been progressively desegregated since the late 1970s, the inmate-oninmate assault rate was found to be lower among inmates who were
racially integrated in double cells; moreover, the rate of racially motivated inmate-on-inmate assaults decreased as the prison system be308
came more desegregated.
This is an interesting result, although the study had some limitations. First, inmates were ineligible for placement in racially integrated double cells if they were members of racial or ethnic gangs or if

305

See id. at 463 (29.2% in 1999, up from 20.4% in 1993); Knox, supra note 107
(estimating that 26.3% of prison violence is gang-related).
306
See AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 297, at 16 tbl.5; Robert S. Fong & Salvador
Buentello, The Detection of Prison Gang Development: An Empirical Assessment, 55 FED.
PROBATION, March 1991, at 66, 66 (citing C. G. CAMP & G. M. CAMP, CRIM. JUST. INST.,
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING PRISON GANG VIOLENCE (1988)).
307
Cf. MONTGOMERY & CREWS, supra note 303, at 73 (detailing a current practice
whereby prison administrators use interfacility transfers to separate rival gangs); Dolovich, supra note 74, at 49 n.250 (“The California Department of Corrections does its
best to house [rival gang members of the] Surenos and Nortenos in separate facilities.”). Self-segregation by gang could thus achieve the result that prison administrators already intend, unless the strategy is in fact to selectively transfer inmates to
achieve a “balance of power” among gangs. See infra text accompanying notes 354-56.
In prisons with rival gangs, officials “tolerate and even facilitate gang control.” See
Dolovich, supra note 74, at 52 (referring to Los Angeles County jails, where rival gangs
have organized to share jail amenities, “since for much of the time it ensures order and
stability”). With more segregation by gang affiliation, this tolerance for gang control
would presumably be less necessary, although such segregation might have deleterious
effects on the outside world. See infra text accompanying notes 350-60.
308
See Chad Trulson & James W. Marquart, The Caged Melting Pot: Toward an Understanding of the Consequences of Desegregation in Prisons, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 743, 762
(2002) (dubbing their theory explaining this trend the “contact hypothesis”).
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they had had previous race-related problems in prison. Second, be310
cause not all interracial assaults were coded as “racially motivated,”
it’s possible that some interracial assaults weren’t considered to be directly motivated by race but were nonetheless motivated by membership in opposite-race gangs. Such membership may not have been
known to the prison authorities so as to disqualify the member from
integrated double-celling.
Even if prisons do become racially more homogeneous, it may
make little difference. To the extent it does make a difference, it
might actually reduce violence, although life could become worse for
those who remain in an otherwise racially homogenous prison.
Finally, regardless of the effect on violence, some might still find
311
the “social meaning” of such racial stratification objectionable. But
312
this voluntary self-segregation wouldn’t be unconstitutional, and
even liberal scholars have been more willing to accept some degree of
racial segregation in prisons (for instance, on a temporary basis after
313
Moreover, while there’s widerace riots) than in other contexts.
spread agreement that children benefit from being exposed to a di314
verse set of their peers, no similar consensus exists for prisoners.

309

Id. at 755. For instance, when Texas was starting to desegregate, gangs pressured inmates to resist desegregation efforts: “In some cases, serious assaults were perpetrated on cell partners to earn a ‘racial restriction’ and be placed in a single-race
cell.” Trulson et al., supra note 295, at 28
310
Trulson & Marquart, supra note 308, at 767-69.
311
Cf. Sarah Spiegel, Comment, Prison “Race Riots”: An Easy Case for Segregation?, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 2261, 2276-85 (2007) (objecting to racial segregation within prisons as a
policy that carries pernicious social meanings).
312
Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding, in the context of a
written exam to join the District of Columbia police force, that a rule’s disproportionate impact alone does not signal a due process violation).
313
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
148 (1980) (concluding that racial separation after a prison riot would meet strict scrutiny); see also Spiegel, supra note 311, at 2263-64 (noting that Paul Brest and John Hart
Ely laid the foundation for accepting “racial segregation” as a legitimate response to
prison rioting (citing Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1976))); id. at 2264 (“Not a single voice, either from the legal
academy or from the courts, has contested the characterization of prison race riots as
the prototypical example of a situation that satisfies strict scrutiny.”).
314
See Brown, supra note 127, at 297 (“[G]rouping students with different traits
may have desirable effects and create a kind of external benefit which would be lost if
students could group themselves.”); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94
(1954) (asserting that segregation in schools is detrimental to children regardless of
the equality in tangible resources). But see U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 1517 (2006), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/112806diversity.pdf (finding little
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3. “Market Success” Arguments Against Vouchers
Suppose that the “market failures” discussed in the previous section are relatively harmless, and that the sort of competition described
above really would improve prisons from a prisoner’s perspective. If
whatever allocative harms some prisoners suffer from being in the
“wrong prison” are outweighed by the benefits of being in a prison
that is of higher overall quality, would the project be worthwhile?
Some of the preferences prisoners likely share seem unequivocally
desirable. Prisoners probably prefer less violence and sexual abuse,
better health care, and better vocational training. They may also pre315
fer prisons close to their families to facilitate visits.
These all seem
unobjectionable, on either humanitarian or rehabilitative grounds,
though many commentators favor more brutal and abusive prisons on
316
“retributive” or deterrence grounds. I put “retributive” in quotation
marks to distinguish the casual, popular, “more is better,” “harsh jus317
tice” approach to punishment from the more serious retributivism
318
of criminal theorists.

to no evidence that diversity in elementary and secondary schools results in significant
academic or social benefit).
315
In the school context, the fact that parents often choose a school based on
proximity as opposed to “quality” is often cited as a negative aspect of voucher programs. This only shows that parents have a broader view of quality than the experts.
Indeed, to the extent a shorter commute makes life more pleasant for the child and
his family, why not consider proximity a valid component of quality?
316
Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 120 (acknowledging arguments
that improvements in indigent defense may not be socially desirable because some
guilty defendants may go unpunished). But see Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison
Rape and the Corruption of Character, 91 IOWA L. REV. 561, 563-64 (2006) (citing prison
rape jokes in popular culture and questioning their social acceptance).
317
See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 15-16 (2003) (arguing that continental European punishments are milder than American ones because of sociopolitical traditions inherited in Europe but rejected by the American Revolution).
318
The latter sometimes cuts in the direction of more punishment, but at other
times argues in favor of less punishment on justice grounds. See, e.g., David Gray &
Jonathan Huber, Retributivism for Progressives: A Response to Professor Flanders, 70 MD. L.
REV. 141, 145 (2010) (“[W]e think that American justice is harsh as measured by retributive standards and that it would be less harsh if policymakers took more seriously
the constraints on punishment that retributivism recommends.”); Robert A. Pugsley, A
Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1501, 1513-23
(1981) (offering an example of retributivism counseling in favor of a less harsh punishment). But see Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Progressive?: A Reply to Professor
Gray and Jonathan Huber, 70 MD. L. REV. 166, 167 (2010) (“[A]re Gray and Huber correct that Kant gives us a ‘retributivism for progressives’? I am skeptical.”); Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 89 (2010) (characterizing as “deeply
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To the extent we favor these unobjectionable preferences, prison
vouchers would beneficially remove prison reform from the hands of
unresponsive democratic majorities and place it in the more responsive hands of impersonal market forces—that is, of competitive prisons and shopping inmates.
But not all prisoner preferences should be satisfied. (If prisoners
had nothing but praiseworthy preferences, why would we have locked
319
them up?)
First, some prisoner preferences shouldn’t be satisfied, even
though they may be morally neutral. Consider amenities like gym facilities and television. These are commonly derided as “country club”
320
amenities, although they can be beneficial in maintaining prisoner
321
discipline. Similarly, conjugal visits, far from being a frivolous luxury, may be important on rehabilitative grounds. Conjugal visits may
reduce the incidence of prison rape, and helping the prisoner main322
tain family connections and marital ties may also reduce recidivism.
Nevertheless, the concern over prisoners’ enjoyment of ameni323
ties—for example, pleasant weather conditions—may be sound.
correct” a critique that at least some types of retributivist philosophy have contributed
to harsh American punitive practices).
319
Although I don’t give any normative weight here to the satisfaction of prisoners’ preferences in themselves, some have argued that an optimal policy should give
equal weight to all happiness, including the happiness criminals derive from committing crimes. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law (including
gains from wrongdoing in social welfare), in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661,
1748 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 48
& n.12 (2000) (same); DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO
DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 229-31 (2000) (same). But see George J. Stigler,
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970) (suggesting that illicit utility should not enter the social welfare calculus).
320
See, e.g., Nygel Lenz, “Luxuries” in Prison: The Relationship Between Amenity Funding and Public Support, 48 CRIME & DELIN. 499, 502, 503-05 (2002) (explaining that the
objects of media complaint—the so-called “Club Feds”—tend to be medium- and lowsecurity prisons, and that a system of rewards and punishments is important in any
prison system).
321
In 1995 and 1999, surveyed correctional administrators were almost evenly split
on whether to eliminate weight lifting for inmates. KNOX, supra note 21, at 463-64.
322
See Rachel Wyatt, Note, Male Rape in U.S. Prisons: Are Conjugal Visits the Answer?,
37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 579, 597-602 (2006) (explaining that conjugal visits serve a
greater purpose than just providing a sexual outlet, and that prison rape may be motivated by more than just a need for sex); see also Suk, supra note 279, at 113-14 (suggesting that prison rape may be the result of a lack of legitimate sexual outlets).
323
Cf. California to Allow Prisoners to Serve Sentences Online, ONION (Sept. 26,
2011), http://www.theonion.com/articles/california-to-allow-prisoners-to-serve-sentenceso,26173 (satirizing California’s prison system).
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Any amenity that improves the prison from the prisoner’s perspective
also presumably dilutes its deterrent value, and therefore may be un324
desirable from an optimal deterrence perspective. Similarly, from a
retributive perspective, even small pleasures should be eliminated
precisely because they’re pleasant.
This reduction in deterrence may be ameliorated by increasing
the prison term, but this solution would be expensive relative to making prison stays shorter but less pleasant. In fact, considering the high
325
social costs of imprisonment, and ignoring any negative effects of
bad prison conditions on rehabilitation, it may be more efficient for
deterrence purposes to concentrate on making prison conditions
326
worse than to lengthen prison terms.
Of course, the full policy analysis is more complicated. Partisans
of prison brutality and rape may be right on deterrence grounds but
wrong on rehabilitation grounds, as brutalization may make prisoners
327
more likely to reoffend after their release.
Having a high-amenity
prison may, on balance, be socially desirable. Further, if the deter328
rence skeptics are right, then we don’t have to worry about ameni324

On prison amenities, see Lenz, supra note 320, at 502, 518. This issue recently
became newsworthy following the arrest of Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring
Breivik and the “posh” conditions of Norwegian prisons, which are “among the cushiest in the world.” See, e.g., The Super-Lux Super Max, FOREIGN POL’Y ( July 25, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/25/the_super_lux_super_max (exhibiting the relatively upscale conditions of Norway’s prisons, including amenities like
personal trainers, recording studios, and a rock-climbing wall).
For evidence that prison conditions, as proxied by prison death rates, have a deterrent effect, see Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318, 331 (2003). See also Kelly Bedard & Eric Helland, The
Location of Women’s Prisons and the Deterrence Effect of “Harder” Time, 24 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 147, 159-61 (2004) (demonstrating that distance between a prison and female
inmate’s home city also has a deterrent effect); cf. Katz et al., supra at 322 (“We cannot
stress enough that evidence of a deterrent effect of poor prison conditions is neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for arguing that current prison conditions are either
overly benign or unjustifiably inhumane.”).
325
See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 492 (2004)
(asserting that nonmonetary sanctions, such as imprisonment, are socially costly,
both in their operation costs to the state and in the opportunity costs suffered by the
incarcerated).
326
Cf. id. at 484-88 (suggesting that, because law enforcement is costly, “sanctions
should be raised until they are maximal,” and the probability of detection should be
correspondingly reduced).
327
See sources cited supra note 17.
328
See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64 (1990) (“The most important normative influence on compliance with the law is the person’s assessment
that following the law accords with his or her sense of right and wrong; a second factor
is the person’s feeling of obligation to obey the law and allegiance to legal authori-
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ties weakening deterrence effects at all. Even so, it is possible that access to some amenities should be restricted.
Second, some prisoner preferences may be affirmatively harmful
to the outside world. I’ve already mentioned that we may want to
force certain prisoners into certain services, like psychological services
329
for the mentally ill. The prisoners likely would not choose this service for themselves; mentally ill prisoners’ distaste for psychiatric
treatment would thus be socially negative. More generally, prisoners
may not value rehabilitation, even if it works (aside from immediately
useful rehabilitation like vocational training). Some sort of training
may have to be mandated.
In a sense, this is similar to mandated curricula in the school context: just as parents can’t always be trusted to choose the best for their
children, so too are prisoners perhaps inadequate selectors of their
own best punishment. Imagine how much more we might mandate in
the curriculum if the students themselves could make curricular
330
choices. Solving the agency problem by allowing prisoners to
choose may exacerbate these negative externalities.
A related concern is that self-selected prisons could be breeding
grounds for racially separatist or extremist religious movements.
Many already complain that prisons are “‘fertile grounds for radical
Muslim chaplains to recruit’ adherents as inmates are already disaf331
fected with America.”
Thus, critics may fear that prison vouchers
could lead to inmates self-selecting into a prison for Muslim radicals.
Compare this to the debate about school vouchers, and the fear that
parents will have socially undesirable plans for their children’s educa332
333
tion and send their kids to witches’ coven schools or madrassas, or

ties.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953-56 (2003)
(identifying three prerequisites to criminal deterrence and arguing that potential offenders do not meet the prerequisites). But see sources cited supra note 324.
329
See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
330
See supra text accompanying note 261.
331
DeGirolami, supra note 48, at 34 (quoting MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 145 (2005)); see also John W. Popeo, Comment, Combating Radical Islam in Prisons Within the Legal Dictates of the Free Exercise Clause,
32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 135, 148-50 (2006) (describing the current Bureau of Prisons policies in place to allow Muslim inmates to freely practice their
religion while simultaneously discouraging violence and terrorism).
332
E.g., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note 118, at
12-14 (noting that many parents don’t cite academic concerns for choosing schools);
GUTMANN, supra note 247, at 30-31 (suggesting that historically parents have not
taught their children the value of mutual respect and tolerance); Elmore, supra note
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schools whose student makeup matches their children’s race or socio334
economic class.
Is this concern over radicalization mere paranoia? Perhaps, but I
don’t know for sure. A 2004 report from the DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General shows that conversion and radicalization of inmates
does happen sometimes—domestic terrorists Richard Reid and Jose
335
Padilla are the highest-profile recent examples.
But the report
doesn’t reveal just how common these examples are. At least one informed observer—Paul Rogers, president of the American Correc253, at 306-09 (citing strong parental preferences for close geographic proximity between home and school).
On the other hand, Caroline Hoxby argues that parents’ preferences for their
children’s schooling tend to be rational. Caroline M. Hoxby, The Effects of School Choice
on Curriculum and Atmosphere (arguing that parental choice of school districts encourages more parental involvement, “more challenging curriculums, stricter academic
requirements, and more structured and discipline-oriented environments,” but not
necessarily “sports or extracurricular activities”), in EARNING AND LEARNING: HOW
SCHOOLS MATTER, supra note 204, at 281, 311-12; see also Banzhaf & Bhalla, supra
note 278, at 8 & n.6 (collecting sources documenting that “households are willing to
pay . . . more for housing in districts supplying more educational services”).
333
E.g., William J. Bennett, Perspective on School Vouchers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993,
at B7 (“In the increasingly shrill world of the NEA and the CTA, allowing parents to
pick the schools their children will attend raises the specter of ‘David Koresh High
School,’ science courses in which students learn how to make Molotov cocktails, witches’ covens, etc.”); Neon Mama, School Vouchers Create Madrassas Here, DAILY KOS (Oct.
23, 2006, 2:50 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/10/23/260889/-SchoolVouchers-create-Madrassas-here (passionately asserting the view that school vouchers
are a mechanism to segregate and brainwash children); cf. Paul Thoreson, Letter to
the Editor, Cartoon on Vouchers Was Unfair and in Poor Taste, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Oct. 5, 2001, at B9, available at LexisNexis (search “San Diego Union-Tribune” database for “Cartoon on Vouchers”) (condemning a cartoon that drew a connection between school vouchers and religious terrorism).
334
See, e.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-41 (1968) (holding that a
“freedom of choice” school assignment plan was not an end in itself but only a means
by which to achieve segregation); GUTMANN, supra note 247, at 119-21 (discussing possible parental preferences for racial and religious separatism); Wendy Parker, The Color
of Choice: Race and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563, 568 (2001) (discussing use of
school choice to evade desegregation). One can argue against this position in various
ways. For instance, perhaps government shouldn’t care about children’s religious education; also, housing patterns under the current system already induce racial or class
segregation in schools. See Hoxby, supra note 285, at 68 (“[M]any city residents are
likely to use vouchers to exercise the degree of self-sorting that suburban residents already exercise.”); Shleifer, supra note 12, at 146 (identifying the potential for segregation as a critique of voucher programs). But cf. Elmore, supra note 253, at 307-08 (discussing a choice system in Cambridge, Massachusetts that “resulted in substantial
reduction of racial isolation and substantial reduction in the previous racial identification by schools”).
335
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS’ SELECTION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS 6-9 (2004).
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tional Chaplains Association—commented that the problem has been
336
“blown out of proportion.”
But to the extent this fear is warranted, prison vouchers may actually alleviate the problem. Some of the concern stems from the activi337
ties of Muslim clerics, but many blame primarily an inmate-driven
“breed of ‘Prison Islam’ that distorts [traditional] Koranic teaching to
338
promote violence and gang loyalty.” The heavy influence of radicalism in Muslim observance in prison, in turn, may be caused by an
“acute [Muslim] clerical shortage”—as of 2006, there was only one
339
chaplain for every 900 inmates. Moreover, fears about Muslim religious activity in prison are founded not only on the radicalization of
340
existing Muslims, but also on the conversion of non-Muslims. Allowing Muslim prisoners to self-segregate may alleviate the clerical shortage through economies of scale in chaplaincy and may reduce recruitment among non-Muslims.
Thus, this concern might not be well-supported with regard to
Muslims; but perhaps it may still be justified in other cases.
Moving on to other examples of undesirable prisoner preferences:
would prisoners prefer prisons that help them escape? Clearly they
would, but this preference is easy to control. Prison escapes are even341
tually, even if not immediately, highly public affairs, so voucher prisons could simply be heavily penalized for escapes. But while this example may seem silly, it has a serious core: sometimes (though not for

336

Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy of the U.S. Military and Prisons:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 32 (2003) [hereinafter Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy]
(statement of Paul E. Rogers, President, Am. Corr. Chaplains Assoc.).
337
See Popeo, supra note 331, at 140 (observing that Muslim chaplains provided by
the Bureau of Prisons were alleged to have been connected to terrorism and Wahhabism); id. at 150 (discussing former New York State Department of Corrections chaplain’s support of Wahhabism and pro-terrorism preaching after 9/11).
338
Primary Sources: “Prison Islam,” ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2004, at 48 (citing U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 335, at 8), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2004/09/primary-sources/3427; cf. Knox, supra note 107, at 15 (stating that about half of prisons surveyed allow inmates to serve as spiritual leaders).
339
Popeo, supra note 331, at 138 (quoting Primary Sources: “Prison Islam,” supra
note 338); see also Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy, supra note 336, at 33 (identifying state budget deficits as a reason behind the elimination of correctional chaplains).
340
See Popeo, supra note 331, at 136 (explaining that Wahhabi organizations focus
on radicalizing prisoners).
341
But see JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL PRISONER MACHINE: HOW AMERICA PROFITS
FROM CRIME 204, 211, 221 (2000) (noting some private prisons’ successful efforts to
cover up problems, such as CCA’s concealment of escapes from its Youngstown facility);
Developments, supra note 40, at 1884 (same).
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escapes) undesirable activities are hard to observe. In such cases,
voucher prisons may have broad scope to cater to prisoners’ antisocial
preferences.
One example is easy access to contraband. Voucherized prisons
may not have much of an incentive to control contraband like pornography, but this likely wouldn’t be terribly harmful. For contraband like drugs or tobacco, voucherized prisons may again have little
incentive to limit proliferation, except to the extent that drugs make
prisoners violent. In that case, at least some prisons would have an incentive to control drugs in order to attract security-conscious inmates.
This last point also applies to weapons. If prisons are motivated to
improve security, they will also be motivated to control the flow of
weapons into the prison.
Even if voucher prisons would have few incentives to control contraband, public prisons already do a bad job. It is no secret that prisons can’t effectively control the flow of drugs, even into high-security
342
prisons.
Inmates often have drug ties, and the stakes of the inprison trade are high, as illegal drugs and tobacco can be sold for up
343
to ten times their street value in prison.
Prisons may also choose to cater to criminals interested in running their criminal enterprise from within the prison. Prisons could
attract such criminals by loosely monitoring incoming and outgoing
344
mail, phone calls, and visits.
Cell phone smuggling is a related problem, as “[i]llegal cell
phones are used to circumvent supervision of conversations, and can
be used by inmates to orchestrate criminal activity, plan escapes, and

342

See Cindy Carcamo, Keeping a Close Watch, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 31, 2003, at B1,
available at 2003 WLNR 2843074 (estimating that “inspectors catch only about 5% of
drugs sent through” Corcoran State Prison in California).
343
See IRA SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW 240 (2d ed. 2001)
(explaining that a small bag of tobacco worth less than a dollar outside of prison can
sell for twenty-five dollars inside); Carcamo, supra note 342 (noting that a hit of heroin
sold for $10 on the streets goes for about $50 inside Corcoran State Prison); Greg Garland, Contraband Floods Md. Prisons: Officials Struggle to Stem Inflow of Drugs, Tobacco,
BALT. SUN, July 6, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 10576160 (“A pound of loose
tobacco that costs $100 to get into a prison can bring upward of $1,000 once inside.”).
344
To some extent, prisons do try to control inmates’ attempts to continue their
outside criminal activities from the inside. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note
63, at V-10 (stating that inmates who utilize the telephone for criminal activities are
subject to increased security measures).
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345

be a menace outside of prison walls.” Inmates have always been able
to plan criminal activity or intimidate witnesses through prison visits
by confederates, calls on approved prison phones, and other means,
but communication with the outside has its costs. La Nuestra Familia
members resort to various methods, including use of the Aztec language, “micro writing,” codes, messages hidden in artwork, and relay346
Cell phones can reing messages sent through paroled members.
duce these costs substantially, and detecting progressively smaller
modern cell phones has become more difficult in recent years.
To the extent cell phones encourage disorder and violence within
the prison, we might expect voucher prisons to police cell phone smuggling. Unfortunately, this may not hold true since the main disadvantages of cell phone smuggling likely flow to people on the outside,
such as intimidated witnesses or future crime victims. Cell phone jamming technology may provide a technological resolution to this prob347
lem, although implementation would require a change in the law.
The bottom line on smuggling is that prisons will have incentives
348
to control some forms of smuggling but not others.

345

Lawmakers Push to Criminalize Prison Cell Phone Smuggling as Problem Spreads, CAL.
DEP’T CORR. & REHAB. (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/Press_Release_
Archive/2009_Press_Releases/April_14.html.
346
David Skarbek, Putting the “Con” into Constitutions: The Economics of Prison Gangs,
26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 195 (2010).
347
One commentator notes:
The FCC, and therefore the wireless industry, has interpreted the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit intentional interference with any
wireless signal: “[T]he [marketing, sale or operation] of transmitters designed to prevent, jam or interfere with the operation of cellular and personal
communications service . . . telephones . . . is unlawful” under Section 333 of
the Act. . . . The federal government is exempted from this prohibition . . . ,
but the exemption does not apply to state and local entities.
Erin Fitzgerald, Comment, Cell “Block” Silence: Why Contraband Cellular Telephone Use in
Prisons Warrants Federal Legislation to Allow Jamming Technology, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1269,
1282-83 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 333 (2006) and Public Notice, Sale or Use of Transmitters Designed to Prevent, Jam or Interfere with Cell Phone Communications is Prohibited in the United States, 20 FCC Rcd. 11134, 11134 ( June 27, 2005) (alteration in
original)); see also Jack Dolan, Blocking Cells in Cellblocks, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2011, at
AA 1 (detailing the California prisons’ plans to pursue a deal with companies providing in-prison phone services to install cell phone signal-blocking technology); Prisons
and Mobile Phones: Bricking the Intruders, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 39 (noting that a
bill allowing state prisons to jam mobile phone signals is unlikely to pass).
348
Smuggling can still be measured, albeit imperfectly. The government could try to
smuggle contraband into the prison—perhaps by using a fake inmate who would try to
acquire drugs or a cell phone, or by using a real inmate whose cooperation has been purchased. A prison that is discovered to be tolerating smuggling could thus expect to suffer
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Recall the discussion above about self-segregation by race or eth349
nicity. There, I argued that such self-segregation may not be bad for
inmates, since whatever benefits diversity provides to students, such
benefits are probably smaller for adult prisoners. Given the correlation between race and prison gangs, self-segregation may actually have
the beneficial effect of reducing violence.
But self-segregation has negative effects beyond prison. Being
around members of one’s own community, and members of one’s
own outside criminal community, makes prison less undesirable, and
therefore constitutes an amenity that reduces prison’s deterrent value.
Further, many gangs, like the Mexican Mafia, La Nuestra Familia, or
350
the Nazi Low Riders, operate on the outside as well as in prison. In
351
fact, various outside gangs may have originated in prison. Thanks to
352
telephone and mail monitoring and other measures, gangs that operate across prisons and in the outside world experience difficulties in
353
Concentrating gang members in one place would
communicating.
penalties. This strategy will only be as effective as inmates’ willingness to serve as conscientious double agents, so some smuggling—particularly the kind that is harmful but not contrary to the interests of prison administrators—may continue to be a problem.
349
See supra text accompanying notes 282-95.
350
See, e.g., United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 970 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that
the Mexican Mafia gained influence outside of the prison system by taxing drug dealers and collecting dues from Mexican street gangs); CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN CALIFORNIA: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 2004,
at 8-11, available at http://ag.ca.gov/publications/org_crime2004.pdf (explaining how
California gangs maintain criminal contacts inside and outside of prison); Fong &
Buentello, supra note 306, at 66 (arguing that prison gangs have developed into organized crime syndicates); James B. Jacobs, Foreword: Focusing on Prison Gangs, CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Winter 2001, at vi (highlighting the danger of prison gangs working
to bolster street gangs); David Skarbek, Governance and Prison Gangs, 105 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 702, 709-14 (2011) (describing broad categories of Mexican Mafia activity occurring inside and outside of prison). The Mexican Mafia also provides socially useful
services by “regulat[ing] drive-by shootings, which bring law enforcement and media
attention.” Id. at 711 (citing TONY RAFAEL, THE MEXICAN MAFIA 37 (2007)). According to George Knox, not all prison gangs also operate in the outside world: in Illinois,
the Southern Illinois Association and the Northsiders, both white “self-protection”
gangs that formed in response to minority gangs, are exclusively prison gangs. KNOX,
supra note 21, at 431-32.
351
See Knox & Tromanhauser, supra note 299, at 15 (citing LAWRENCE J. BOBROWSKI,
COLLECTING, ORGANIZING AND REPORTING STREET GANG CRIME (1988)); Steve Daniels,
Prison Gangs: Confronting the Threat, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Apr. 1987, at 66.
352
See AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 297, at 21 tbl.8 (showing frequent use of telephone monitoring in prisons); KNOX, supra note 21, at 464 (stating that in 1999,
91.4% of surveyed correctional administrators believed telephone monitoring and
91.5% believed mail monitoring stopped gang members from maintaining ties to outside gang members).
353
See supra text accompanying note 346.
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probably reduce these communication costs. This is why various prison systems try to disperse gangs throughout many different institu354
Individual prisons also try to isolate gang leaders or memtions.
355
356
bers by transferring them among prisons or even out of state.
Concentrating gang members might not be all bad. Just as dis357
persing a gang increases its recruitment opportunities,
self358
segregation may reduce the gang’s power.
Other aspects of the
prison voucher system might also reduce the power of prison gangs.
Prison gangs control street gangs in large part by threatening violence
against gang members who don’t pay and by offering protection to
359
gang members who do. To the extent that prison vouchers lead to a
360
more secure prison environment, gangs’ carrot-and-stick scheme
would be less effective, thus reducing their influence.
This whole discussion implies a continuing role for government
regulation to prevent prisons from offering amenities that are too attractive and to prevent prisons from catering to prisoners’ socially un361
desirable preferences. One way to implement this would be to create an oversight agency with the ability to prevent prisons from

354

Peter M. Carlson, Prison Interventions: Evolving Strategies to Control Security Threat
Groups, CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Winter 2001, at 10, 21. California separated different
groups in the 1970s, but moved to integrated yards in the 1980s, which reduced violence. Id. at 16.
355
E.g., KNOX, supra note 21, at 437 (explaining that a maximum-strength model
for a zero-tolerance gang policy would include removing from the general population
all active and verified gang members and placing them in isolation); id. at 466 (showing institutions increasingly consider gang membership in inmate classification); Knox,
supra note 107, at 27 (“[T]wo-thirds [of surveyed prisons] have classification systems
that consider gang membership”).
356
See AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 297, at 20-21; KNOX, supra note 21, at 448, 46768; MONTGOMERY & CREWS, supra note 303, at 27; see also Knox & Tromanhauser, supra
note 299, at 17 tbl.1, 19 (showing that 54.2% of administrators had used transfers to
control gang activity); Mark S. Fleisher & Scott H. Decker, An Overview of the Challenge
of Prison Gangs, CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q., Winter 2001, at 7-8 (discussing use of out-ofstate transfers to disrupt gang activity).
357
See Fleisher & Decker, supra note 356, at 8 (stating that transfers may function
to spread gangs rather than control them).
358
Not all prison systems rely on dispersing inmates. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note
354, at 21 (describing Connecticut system of disincentives for inmates in gang activity).
Knox lamented in 2000 that “[t]here has been absolutely no evaluation research whatsoever reported on the efficacy of any of [the common] techniques or strategies for
dealing with gangs in the correctional environment.” KNOX, supra note 21, at 441.
359
Skarbek, supra note 350, at 702.
360
See supra Section III.A.
361
See supra text accompanying note 148.
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offering, or competing based on, particular amenities that it finds to
362
be undesirable.
This proposal would be a total reversal of the current political dynamic, where political forces work to keep prison quality low, and improving it is extremely difficult.
But government regulation, by agency or otherwise, is an imperfect fix because not all undesirable amenities can be monitored. The
“market success” argument against prison vouchers is strong, since social losses stemming from satisfying undesirable prisoner preferences
may be great. The question is whether this residual amount of undesirable activity outweighs the desirable consequences of prisoner
choice, such as reducing prison assaults and rapes, improving medical
care, alleviating overcrowding, and providing better job training.
IV. THE POLITICS OF PRISON VOUCHERS
I have already discussed how prison vouchers could completely reverse the current political dynamic, which conspires to keep prisons
low quality. Government instead would have to intervene to keep
prisons from becoming too “good” from the prisoners’ perspective
and maintain prison’s deterrent force.
The revolutionary potential of vouchers may be more important
for prisons than for schools. There seems to be more hope to reform
schools politically, without using choice, because society at large em363
pathizes with students in failing schools. Prisoners, by contrast, are
generally despised, tend to come from communities without political
364
power, and are often disenfranchised.
This proposal is of course subject to the same critique as all reform proposals seeking to remedy a politically insoluble problem. If
the problem is politically insoluble, there are likely constituencies opposed to any remedy at all, and therefore any reform, even if perfect,
365
may never be adopted. Section A presents a practical vision of how
prison vouchers could be adopted. Essentially, if it is true that vouch-

362

For an argument that this is politically feasible, see infra text accompanying
note 385.
363
See supra note 24.
364
See, e.g., Sigler, supra note 251, at 160 (explaining that inmates are virtually
powerless to effect changes in prison conditions because they do not have a strong political position); Developments, supra note 40, at 1942-49 (describing various states’ felon
disenfranchisement laws).
365
Cf. supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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ers would improve prison quality and would also make faith-based
prisons constitutional, vouchers could be adopted by a coalition of
groups interested in prisoner welfare and groups interested in prison
ministry—a coalition that would not exist for prison reform alone.
Section B speculates on the political fate of vouchers once they are
adopted. One possibility is that funding might decrease if prison
quality improves; another is that the political system could regulate
prison quality to prevent it from becoming too good, perhaps by administrative agency.
A. An Adoption Coalition
One can tell a plausible story about how prison vouchers might
succeed politically. Support for prison vouchers is different than support for arbitrary prison-conditions reform; the political infeasibility of
the latter need not imply the political infeasibility of the former.
The “cultural cognition” literature suggests how to mobilize constituencies by cleverly packaging reforms to convince different groups
that their concerns are being heard. For instance, Dan Kahan and his
coauthors argue that conservatives during the George H.W. Bush administration were convinced to support the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 because environmental improvements were packaged
366
with an emissions permit–trading scheme. Similarly, packaging nuclear power as a way to reduce reliance on fossil fuels responsible for
global warming not only convinces environmentalists to become more
supportive of nuclear power, but also convinces those generally unsympathetic to environmental concerns to become more supportive of
367
action to address global warming.

366

See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on
Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1097-98 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF
FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)) (dubbing this phenomenon
the “self-affirmation effect”).
367
Id. at 1098; see also, e.g., id. at 1098-99 (discussing similar mechanisms that led
both pro-life and pro-choice factions to support an abortion law in France); id. at 10991100 (exploring potential packaging mechanisms as options to achieve consensus on
gun policy); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 168-70 (2006) (using the success of abortion reforms in
France and the emergence of political consensus favoring tradeable emissions as examples of self-affirmation); Amanda Leiter, The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting Majorities, and the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31, 47-48 (2008)
(reviewing the self-affirmation theory through the lens of air pollution regulation and
nuclear power policy).
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Prison vouchers could take advantage of a similar dynamic. People on the left may not be inclined to support vouchers, but some
could change their view if the program were packaged as a way to improve prison conditions. Economic conservatives may not be interested in improving prison conditions, but they might approve of vouchers being tested in a new field, both to allow market forces to operate
and because prison vouchers, if successful, may strengthen the case
for vouchers in other areas, such as education. Furthermore, social
conservatives may support prison vouchers because such a program
368
Such a left/right
could make faith-based prisons constitutional.
prison-reform coalition isn’t unheard of: a bipartisan coalition enacted RLUIPA based on reports revealing the heavy-handed treatment of
369
prisoners’ religious claims, and the Prison Rape Elimination Act was
370
likewise a bipartisan effort (indeed, it passed unanimously).
As
Robert Weisberg and David Mills write, “The clear interest of [conservative evangelical organizations] in promoting religion among inmates has helped create a strange-bedfellowship with leftist prisoners’
371
rights groups.”
This scenario is possible even without relying on “cultural cognition” theory. Cass Sunstein has disputed Kahan’s account of the
Clean Air Act, arguing that conservatives supported emissions trading
not because of any clever crossover packaging, but rather because the
Bush White House was under pressure to pass air quality legislation
372
and emissions trading was the cheapest option.
Similarly, there
needn’t be anything cultural about voucher support; the left and different wings of the right can support prison vouchers for rational reasons, even if those reasons are different for each group.
This sort of coalition provides one explanation of how vouchers
could be enacted—with all the potential beneficial effects for prisoners—even though there isn’t enough of a political constituency to improve prisoner welfare by more direct means. The entire coalition
needn’t be motivated by prisoner well-being. And once vouchers are
enacted, the need to urge legislators or administrators to act contrary
to their political self-interest evaporates; rather, the changes happen
automatically, through market mechanisms. In addition, “vouchers”

368
369
370
371
372

See supra Section II.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 231-34.
See Weisberg & Mills, supra note 236.
Id.
Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1120-21 (2006).
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needn’t be an all-or-nothing proposition; politics would also determine which type of voucher scheme would be adopted.
School vouchers are an instructive example. Universal school
vouchers have repeatedly failed at the polls, in part because of opposi373
tion from upper-income homeowners.
Under a system of assigned
neighborhood schools, the value of local schools is capitalized into
home values. Homes in good areas—areas which, under a system of
local property tax-funded schools, tend to also have good schools—are
worth even more, and homes in bad areas are worth even less: the
374
Universal school vouchers partially break the conrich get richer.
nection between where one lives and where one attends school, although distance still counts for something. Thus, vouchers will reduce
375
home prices in good areas and increase them in bad areas. Small
wonder that upper-middle-class homeowners, whose schools are already good, don’t support universal vouchers.
In a sense, this is good news for prison vouchers, which do not
376
imply reallocations of property-based wealth. More to the point, the
political problems of universal school vouchers have led to the adop377
tion of targeted vouchers, for instance to students in failing schools.
Thus, even if universal prison vouchers don’t have a constituency,

373

Thomas J. Nechyba, Introducing School Choice into Multidistrict Public School Systems, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 70, at 145, 189-91.
374
Eric Brunner et al., Capitalization and the Voucher: An Analysis of Precinct Returns
from California’s Proposition 174, 50 J. URBAN ECON. 517, 519-21 (2001).
375
See id. at 519 (explaining that the quality of a community’s public schools affects home value); Nechyba, supra note 373, at 189 (noting that “homeowners in good
districts experience relatively large capital losses” in a voucher system while those in
poor districts experience gains).
376
Actually, this isn’t quite true. To the extent that corrections officials tend to
assign inmates to prisons near their homes and families—and to the extent that inmates would choose different prisons under a voucher system—prison vouchers, like
school vouchers, would break the link between place of residence and place of incarceration (or education), which can alter residential patterns. Criminals who expect to
be eventually incarcerated wouldn’t need to live near a high-quality prison—they
could just choose it with their vouchers. Frankly, I find this mechanism quite speculative, to say the least. But I thought it worth mentioning as a potential intriguing implication of the system. Cf. MARIO PUZO, THE LAST DON 56 (1996) (describing the fictional Don Clericuzio, who upon hearing that Americans believed it was better to let a
hundred guilty men go free than to convict one innocent man was “[s]truck almost
dumb by the beauty of the concept . . . [and] became an ardent patriot”); Alexander
Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 204 (1997) (advising criminals to move to
New Mexico or Oklahoma, where the presumption of innocence, judging by state
courts’ statements of the Blackstone ratio, seems strongest).
377
See Nechyba, supra note 373, at 189-91.
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there may still be a possibility for vouchers targeted, for example, to
prisoners at the worst-performing prisons.
B. Post-Adoption Coalitions and Politics
However, if there is a fundamental constituency opposed to good
prison conditions, whether for deterrence purposes or because of
378
populist “tough-on-crime” retributivism, that constituency won’t stay
silent. Even if the pro-voucher constituency remains intact, so that
vouchers, once adopted, aren’t repealed, the voucher scheme will still
be responsive to popular politics.
First, much depends on how generously the vouchers are funded.
As noted above, the per-pupil value of school vouchers is less than per379
pupil costs in public schools, and it’s unclear at what level prison
vouchers would be initially funded. If vouchers indeed improve pris380
on conditions, what funding level should rational voters choose?
Over time, voters would most likely decrease funding because as
prison spending is more productive, the resulting savings could be
applied to other social goals like welfare, education, the military, or
381
tax reduction.
Economic conservatives might accept funding decreases to pay for more worthy causes or provide tax relief. Religious
conservatives might accept funding decreases so long as they don’t
threaten the viability of faith-based prisons, which may already be
cheaper due to subsidies from local churches. Finally, although
“tough on crime” and deterrence-minded voters who want prison
conditions to be bad may not have been part of the coalition that enacted vouchers, they will join the coalition to defund them. This latter
constituency may assert itself through populist outrage at the amenities enjoyed by inmates.
These funding decreases will reduce the ultimate extent of any
improvement vouchers may offer. In the extreme case, funding may
fall to keep prisoner welfare constant; all the benefits will thus accrue
to the taxpayers, and none to the prisoners themselves. This extreme
378

See supra text accompanying notes 315-18.
See supra note 128.
380
For a discussion of endogenously determined voucher parameter levels under
different sorts of school voucher schemes (a universal lump-sum voucher, a meanstested voucher, and a means-equalizing voucher), see Raquel Fernández & Richard
Rogerson, School Vouchers as a Redistributive Device: An Analysis of Three Alternative Systems, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 70, at 195, 221-24.
381
Cf. Hoxby, supra note 198, at 1236-37 (arguing that, empirically, Tiebout choice
improves school productivity by increasing quality while decreasing spending).
379
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case seems especially likely if prisoner welfare helps no one but prisoners. However, given that prisoner welfare does have some positive
spillover for the rest of society such as rehabilitation, prisoners may
reap at least some part of the gains.
This argument is highly speculative. The main point is that the
level of funding is endogenous, so defenses of vouchers that rely on
382
predicted quality improvements for a given level of funding may be
383
mistaken.
So far, I’ve assumed that the only political avenue open after
vouchers are approved involves fine-tuning the level of funding.
However, there are also regulatory alternatives, which may be more
attractive to deterrence- and retributivism-minded voters.
I mentioned above that there’s a continuing role for regulation to
play in preventing prisoners from choosing amenities that are positively harmful, or amenities that are neutral but dilute the deterrent
384
value of prison. One way to implement such regulation would be to
designate an agency—possibly the Department of Corrections or some
385
independent agency —to oversee prison offerings and to prevent
specified amenities from being offered or advertised. There’s probably an overlap between amenities preferred by efficiency-minded voters (where the rehabilitative value outweighs the decrease in deterrence value) and those preferred by retributivist voters (where the
amenity is consistent with the moral purposes of punishment). If such
a system works, then both deterrence-minded and retributivismminded voters should have more confidence that, to the extent prisoner welfare increases, such increase is acceptable. The more effective such regulation, the less pressure there will be to reduce the level
of the voucher.
382

Cf. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 118-19 (“Until now we have put to
one side the question of how generously indigent defense services will be funded; we
have simply argued that, with whatever resources society allocates to indigent defense,
freedom of choice will enhance the quality of the services delivered.”). But see id. (arguing also that a voucher system will alleviate funding inadequacies by making them
more visible).
383
Some privatization critics charge that prison privatization will make prisoners
worse off because it will send the message that prisoners are “not our problem.” See
DiIulio, supra note 195, at 74 (“[S]ocietal pressures against inmate abuse and political
corruption will be at low ebb when these largely underclass and minority populations of
offenders are placed in nonpublic hands.”). However, these concerns, even if true, are
not issues here, since vouchers don’t need to change the level of prison privatization.
384
See supra text accompanying notes 361-62.
385
See HARDING, supra note 145, at 161-65 (proposing a prison model where private and public prisons are governed by an independent authority).
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In other work, I’ve considered the argument that prison privatization increases pro-incarceration political advocacy on the theory that
private prisons, unlike public prisons, benefit from having more in386
I’ve argued that this
mates and keeping them behind bars longer.
increase is unlikely: public corrections officers’ unions are already
major pro-incarceration lobbyists, and introducing more private prisons could decrease the total amount of political advocacy, since any
benefits from lobbying for increased incarceration would have to be
shared with the rest of the prison sector.
This conclusion depended on the assumption that “targeted” lobbying is difficult—that a private prison firm or a public corrections officers’ union will find it difficult to lobby for an increase in incarcera387
tion that would benefit the lobbying group exclusively.
If,
hypothetically, a single private prison firm, or the whole private-prison
388
industry acting as a bloc, operated all minimum-security prisons
while public prisons operated all maximum-security prisons, the private firm would get all the benefit of its lobbying if it advocated a particular pro-incarceration measure that only affected minimum-security
prisoners, like increased penalties for white-collar crime. However, I
considered that possibility to be fairly remote since private firms currently operate a range of facilities similar to the public sector.
In a world with vouchers, though, there may be more and more
specialized prisons catering to identifiable niches of prisoners. In such
a world, the possibility that private firms might lobby in favor of incarceration could emerge as a realistic possibility. Depending on one’s
389
view of self-interested, pro-incarceration lobbying, this possibility
might affect one’s opinion regarding the desirability of vouchers.

386

See Volokh, supra note 268, at 1220-21 (arguing that prison privatization will not
lead to more pro-incarceration advocacy); see also Alexander Volokh, Privatization, Free
Riding, and Industry-Expanding Lobbying, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 62, 65-66 (2010)
(“[C]oncerns that privatization will increase the amount or effect of advocacy . . . are
unfounded . . . .”).
387
Volokh, supra note 386, at 67.
388
See Volokh, supra note 268, at 1237-40 (describing the different possible forms
of cooperation among private prisons); see also Volokh, supra note 386, at 64 (explaining how each form of collusion would affect industry-expanding advocacy).
389
See Volokh, supra note 268, at 1203 (assuming, for purposes of the analysis,
“that economically self-interested pro-incarceration advocacy is undesirable”); id. at
1248-49 (advancing the idea that pro-incarceration advocacy is not always selfinterested, or if self-interested, is not necessarily bad).
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CONCLUSION
In the Introduction, I invited the reader to speculate on prison
vouchers by drawing an analogy with school vouchers. Throughout,
I’ve cited the education literature to see how it can inform our predictions as to the operation of prison choice. Let’s briefly do the same
exercise in reverse and see whether thinking about prisons can shed
any light on education.
In today’s political environment, school voucher proponents and
partisans of private education typically identify with the right, in part
because most private schools are religious. The status quo of public
schools is identified with the left, although many on the left favor reforming public education from within. Reinforcing this dynamic,
vouchers are associated with economic arguments about the benefits of
390
competition, which tend to be associated with the free market right.
However, for prisons, the political valence is reversed. Prison reformers are usually associated with the left, though privatization proponents (who are usually on the right) argue strenuously that privatization would improve prison quality. Opposition to prison reform
(the status quo) is associated with the law-and-order right.
Suppose that prison vouchers would improve the well-being of
prisoners, particularly regarding prisoner health care and freedom
from assault—shortcircuiting the unsympathetic political and judicial
processes. Further suppose that the negative effects discussed above
don’t outweigh the positives, so that vouchers end up actually being a
good idea. If so, from a prison-reform perspective, vouchers would
have worked a humanitarian miracle. Might the left then reconsider
its opposition to vouchers in general, even as a tool of school reform?
It may seem fanciful to think that people would change their
minds entirely. After all, education and prisons are distinct topics,
391
with different policy concerns. What works in prison reform might
not work in education. But at least, if some people had been uncomfortable with the very idea of vouchers, due to a general unease with
market-based arguments, perhaps a positive experience with prison
vouchers would make these people more willing to entertain arguments in favor of vouchers in other areas.

390

But this is not necessarily so. See Forman, supra note 3, at 1309-12 (discussing
the supportive contributions of progressives to the school voucher debate).
391
See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 76-77 (concluding that varying policy
considerations animate support for or opposition to privatization in different areas).
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Consider the same issue from the other side. People on the right
who are unsympathetic to prisoners may oppose the idea of prison
vouchers because vouchers give unwarranted decisionmaking authority to prisoners. Depriving prisoners of decisionmaking authority may
be considered another form of punishment, supported on retributivist
grounds. Or perhaps this opposition comes from the disconnect between prisoners’ and nonprisoners’ preferences: after all, social welfare does not include only prisoner welfare, but also (and perhaps
primarily) the welfare of victims and members of society as a whole.
But this last point is the exact argument made by the anti-schoolvoucher left. While some on the right have treated parental choice as
an end in itself, communitarian arguments have stressed the interests
of the children left behind, the true interests of children (such as racial balance) that some parents may not adequately value, the presence of antisocial values among certain parents, and the interests of
society as a whole. Perhaps greater exposure to communitarian arguments against prison vouchers will make school voucher advocates
more accepting of communitarian arguments generally—which
might, in the long run, undermine their own arguments in favor of
school choice.
On the constitutional side, under a voucher system, I’ve noted
that everyone should be entitled to a spot in a prison that provides the
whole usual complement of rights. This means that (focusing on the
Establishment Clause) they’re entitled to a secular prison spot; it also
means that (focusing on the other constitutional rights) they’re entitled to not be offered “deals” that wouldn’t pass muster under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as it’s currently applied in prisons.
So far, this issue rarely, if ever, comes up for schools. Students
almost always have the option of going to a government-run public
school, which by nature must already be compliant. But imagine a
voucherized world where education is still compulsory but government no longer provides it, or even a nonvoucherized world where
392
the government assigns students to a private school.
In such a world, it seems that the government should be required
to provide a compliant school experience to any student who wants
one, either by running a public school of last resort or by contracting
with a private school to provide constitutional rights. This require-

392

See, e.g., Logiodice v. Trs. of Me. Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2002)
(providing an example of a school district that had no public high school and contracted with a private school to educate its students).
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ment of constitutional compliance should exist as long as education is
compulsory; the government could relieve itself of this duty by making
education noncompulsory (not an option for prisons, of course).
At least, that’s the rule that I’d like. Unfortunately, it seems to fit
uneasily within current state action doctrine. The “traditional public
function” doctrine isn’t well suited to schools, and it seems excessive
(under current doctrine) to make all schools into state actors just because of compulsory education laws. But the analysis here suggests a
possible change to state action doctrine: with respect to their status as
custodians of school children subject to compulsory education,
schools should be considered state actors. Of course, these schools
would still be able to benefit from a liberal unconstitutional conditions doctrine as long as any student can demand a “constitutionally
compliant” school; students’ parents would still be able to agree to
waive their children’s rights as the “price” of whatever educational
393
The intuitive reason is the same as for
benefits the school offered.
prisons: as long as education is compulsory, children are forced to at394
tend school just as inmates are forced to go to prison.
Even now, the education system contains both “voluntary” and
“compulsory” students, depending on whether they’re above or below
the compulsory education age. In a fully voucherized world without
public schools, a private school might then have some students with
393

Or perhaps, transcending state action doctrine entirely, the duty to provide the
constitutionally compliant alternative should merely remain with the government itself, rather than with the school. See Metzger, supra note 120, at 1457-61 (advancing
such a theory as part of a new “delegation” analysis).
394
The Supreme Court has occasionally noted the connection between children’s
constitutional rights and the existence of compulsory education laws. However, at
public schools, this connection hasn’t been important, since the mere fact that public
schools are staffed by government employees is already sufficient for state action. See
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (explaining that public schools derive
their authority from the state, not from parental authority, and therefore are subject to
the Fourth Amendment as state actors); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)
(stating that, consistent with compulsory education laws, the state has the authority to
impose corporal punishment); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 81 (1985)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing the distinction between Presidential Proclamations regarding religion aimed at adults “in a noncoercive setting”
and “government-sponsored religious exercises . . . directed at impressionable children
who are required to attend school”); School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (arguing that public-school Bible readings are unconstitutional in part because “school attendance is statutorily compelled”);
cf. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209 (1948) (noting disapprovingly, in the context of a religious education program in public schools, that “[t]he
operation of the State’s compulsory education system . . . assists and is integrated with
the program of religious instruction carried on by separate religious sects”).
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unadulterated due process rights (based on a constitutional-school-oflast-resort contract with the government), other students who (or
whose parents) have traded away their due process rights, and still
other students (above the compulsory education age) who lack due
process rights entirely.
*

*

*

Some advocates for vouchers have been extremely optimistic
about the ability of vouchers to improve quality of service. School
vouchers, for instance, promised to remove education reform from
the hands of unresponsive democratic majorities, obstructionist
teachers’ unions, and an unsympathetic legal system. As early voucher
advocates John Chubb and Terry Moe put it: “Without being too literal about it, we think reformers would do well to entertain the notion
that choice is a panacea . . . . It has the capacity all by itself to bring
about the kind of transformation that, for years, reformers have been
seeking to engineer in myriad other ways.”395
I don’t make any such strong claims about prison vouchers
(though I do agree with Chubb and Moe about the revolutionary potential of market forces). I do believe that prison vouchers, if enacted,
could radically change how prisons work; the question is whether that
change would be for the better. I believe the constitutional effects—
making faith-based prisons constitutional and loosening the unconstitutional conditions doctrine—would probably be positive. But the effects on prison quality are much less clear.
Potential social positives include improvements in the desirable
aspects of prisoner welfare, like lower rates of prison rape and better
prison medical care, along with the benefits that this would yield for society at large, such as more effective rehabilitation and thus lower crime
rates and less spread of communicable disease. These have all been
extremely difficult to attain in the current political climate, as reformers
have had to rely on pro-prisoner legislation, administrative action, or
judicial decisions to effect change. These benefits are substantial.
The negatives include reductions in deterrence from higher prison quality or “improvements” in the antisocial aspects of prisoner welfare that can’t be controlled through regulation. These, too, are
probably substantial.
395

JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS
217 (1990).
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If undesirable actions were fully observable, the negative effects of
396
prison vouchers could be controlled by regulation, for example,
preventing prisons from competing on ease of escape by penalizing
escapes, or mandating cell phone jamming technology. If inmates,
not prisons, are responsible for the undesirable behavior, the regulation could either act on inmates directly (for example, forbidding sex
offenders from transferring into a prison without sex offender treatment), or control inmates indirectly by acting on prisons (reducing or
eliminating voucher revenues from sex offenders if the prison doesn’t
have sex offender treatment).
The real problem arises when undesirable actions are unobserva397
It’s hard to tell how much contraband gets into a prison. We
ble.
398
don’t know who’s a gang member or gang leader, so we can’t control
gang members’ movements if transfer is easy. While some of the negative effects of prison vouchers can be controlled, some uncontrollable
and residual effects will remain that we would just have to live with.
The question is whether these residual negative effects outweigh
the positives. Perhaps they do; perhaps they don’t. I hope this thought
experiment stimulates further inquiry along these lines to investigate
whether prison vouchers are a desirable reform proposal after all.

396

These regulations could be promulgated by the regulatory agency discussed
above. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
397
This is the theory of “incomplete contracts.” See Shleifer, supra note 12, at 137
(referring to the government’s inability to “anticipate, describe, stipulate, regulate,
and enforce exactly what it wants” as an incomplete contract).
398
Several systems keep databases of gang members, but these are naturally quite
incomplete. See, e.g., AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 297, at 8 tbl.1.

